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Most studies on China's media reform believe that the tensions in the reform 
era arise from the interlocking forces of continued Party control and new 
market demands. This qualitative study is based on my field research in the 
advertising department of Zhejiang Provincial TV Station in China from June 
to July 2002. The study tries to explain the process of adaptability of a media 
organization from the neo-economic-sociology perspective by examining the 
mechanism of how the new market logic is incorporated into a party organ 
structure in China's transitional media context. To answer this question, I drew 
from previous institutional and sociology studies on transition societies and 
organizations and identified some patterns of micro-level behaviors in the 
adaptation process. I illustrated these behavioral patterns with the research 
data collected through participant observations and in-depth interviews during 
my field trip. My analysis of the data focuses on how individual actors adopt 
strategic behaviors to deal with different institutional demands in the transition 
process and how these strategic behaviors help the media organization adapt to 
the transitional environment. 
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I put forward the concept of "strategic adaptation" to look at the interaction of 
social actors, organizational structure and institutional constraints, and to 
illustrate how macro-level tensions are dealt with by micro-level strategies, 
thus creating a micro and macro linkage in China's media studies. I categorized 
the micro-level behavioral patterns as three aspects of strategic adaptation, i.e. 
structural adaptation, symbolic adaptation and reciprocal behaviors. 
My study further suggests that many strategic behaviors actors adopt to cope 
with environmental pressure are facilitated by the existence of an ambiguous 
and inconsistent institutional environment. The existence of disagreements 
caused by conflicting institutional demands in a transition process does not 
necessarily limit social actors' strategic choice; on the contrary, it provides a 
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China's media environment in the reform era has been characterized as "full of 
confusions and conflicts" with the interplay of continued state control and 
economic reform forces (Lee, 1994b). Under the communist ideology, China's 
media functions as the Party-state's propaganda tool and the central 
government's mouthpiece. China's media organizations have been established 
to operate in a strictly totalistic and commandist institutional environment. In 
addition to being financially dependent on the central government, they are 
also strictly controlled by the central government in daily operations, financial 
arrangements and personnel managements and operate under highly centralized 
organizational structures. 
As China started its economic reform in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, 
media reform became an unavoidable part of the whole transition process. The 
central government decided to relieve itself from the heavy financial burden of 
subsidizing media outlets and requested media organizations to manage their 
financial needs by themselves. The changes in China's macro media 
environment brought profound changes to the ways in which media 
organizations operate. Market mechanism has been eagerly introduced into 
media organizations' traditional authoritarian structures to help them achieve 
financial targets through advertising revenue. Therefore, we are able to observe 
both macro and micro level changes in the institutional environment driven by 
the "capitalistic style" market force. What used to be pure propaganda tools 
have to learn the game of supply and demand in order to survive market 
competition. In China's media reform, the traditional propaganda tools are 
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pushed to the market under the government policy of "operating a government 
unit like an enterprise" (“shi ye dan wei, qi ye guan "，’). This fairly simple and 
straightforward slogan reflects great deal of ambiguities and conflicts in the 
transition process. With changes in the media environment, China's media 
organizations now have to deal with two sets of rules, the propaganda rules and 
the market rules, at the same time. The playing field for China's media 
organizations is so complex that not only are the market rules imposed onto 
them without the propaganda rules being released, but also that the two sets of 
rules are interwoven and inseparable from each other. Therefore, China's media 
environment in the reform era becomes a unique and interesting context for 
researchers who study transition societies. 
China's economic reform, to many scholars, may provide an example of how 
the government administrative functions and the market functions supplement 
each other to stimulate economic growth. However, we should pay attention to 
the differences between the commercialization process which takes place in 
China's media reform and the frequently studied privatization process where 
transition is based on changes of basic ownership structure. Some researchers 
(e.g. Komai, 1980) refer to reforms with incomplete transition of property right 
and continuing power of central planning as "partial reforms". Similarly, 
China's media reform has been characterized as a process of 
"commercialization without independence" (Chan, 1993). I believe we can also 
borrow the concept of "partial reform" and refer to China's media reform as a 
process of "partial commercialization". In partial commercialization, market 
mechanism is introduced to media organizations which remain under strong 
supervision and authoritarian control by the Party-state, thereby creating a 
duality of institutional demands. Under such circumstances, China's media 
organizations have to deal with both old and new institutional demands at the 
same time, struggling to satisfy the central government's financial needs while 
still acting as the Party-state's mouthpiece. Since there has been little change 
in the ownership structure of the media organizations, these organizations 
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remain government operated organs and their organizational structures remain 
highly centralized. While being partially commercialized, China's media 
organizations have to work under two parallel, and sometimes conflicting, 
institutional logics, i.e. the "vertical" party logic and the "horizontal" market 
logic. 
In China's overall media structure in the transition era, one sector which is 
changing fast is China's advertising market. With the introduction of market 
mechanism into the media structure, advertising revenues increase rapidly. The 
increasing importance of advertising has significantly altered the ways in 
which China's media organizations operate. 
The development of advertising in China has its unique path. In China's 
developing advertising market, advertising is officially described as a means of 
promoting trade, earning foreign exchange and broadening the mass's horizon. 
It has been officially called "an accelerator for the economic development" (Yu 
X. 1991). The central government's official position holds that because 
socialist and capitalist commodity economy differ in nature, socialist 
advertising, the offspring of a socialist commodity economy, should also differ 
from advertising in capitalist countries. This position was clearly stated in the 
Beijing based Guangming Daily (February 15, 1986, P.3) that: "The basic aim 
of socialist advertising is to introduce certain commodities to consumers and it 
is necessary to correctly link advertising with political propaganda. 
Advertising should introduce commodities to consumers and display political 
ideology." This conviction that advertising should promote the appropriate 
political ideology while serving as a marketing tool differentiates the 
advertising environment in China from that in a capitalist context. 
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1.2 Research Question 
In this study, I will look at the operation of the advertising department of 
Zhejiang TV Station, a provincial TV station in China. I am interested to find 
out what role the advertising department plays, in the transition process, in 
helping a government organ deal with the continued authoritarian structure and 
the new market demands at the same time. 
I refer to the advertising department in a TV station as the boundary spanning 
unit, since it functions at the very interface of the propaganda logic and the 
market logic. The advertising department has been established in the media 
reform under market mechanism, but it works in a party organ structure. 
Driven by its supposedly governing logic, the market mechanism, the 
advertising department is expected to specialize in dealing with market needs 
and facilitate market oriented operations in the media organization. However, 
despite the significant changes in the macro institutional environment, China's 
media organizations have largely kept their traditional socialist structure as 
"state working units" where actors have to deal with highly centralized 
decision-makings and abstract governing rules. As a media organization 
struggles to adapt itself to new market needs in the reform era, how does the 
advertising department strategically coordinate between the immediate market 
pressure and a highly centralized party organ structure to maximize the 
financial interest? Therefore, my research question is: how do actors in the 
advertising department facilitate practices or activities governed by the market 
logic in a party organ structure? In other words, my question can also be asked 
as: how is the advertising logic, characterized as a profit-seeking and market 
driven mechanism, incorporated into the party organ structure of a media 
organization in the reform era? 
I am particularly interested in social actors' strategic behaviors in coping with 
institutional inconsistencies and the duality of institutional demands in the 
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transition process. In this study, I draw upon the western neo-institutional 
literatures to try to explain China's experience of media reform. In neo-
institutional literatures, there are extensive studies on the macro-level changes 
in a transition society, but we don't see many micro-level studies on the 
interplay of institutional pressure, organizational structure and social actors' 
involvement in institutional changes. Studies on the macro-level environment 
explain what is happening in the big environment, but do not tell us how the 
environmental conflicts are dealt with on the micro level. Here, I try to analyze 
on the micro level how conflicts arising from the inconsistency of institutional 
demands are dealt with by China's media organizations in the transition process, 
with a focus on the interaction of individual actors, organizational structure and 
institutional constraints. 
We need to note that the duality of institutional demands does not necessarily 
mean that these demands are in conflicts. The inconsistency in institutional 
logics should not lead us to conclude immediately that the old and new 
institutional logics conflict with each other or that changes in the institutional 
environment during the transition process are bound to lead to conflicts in 
satisfying different institutional demands, although this might be the case under 
a lot of circumstances. However, we can reasonably argue that the coexistence 
of institutional demands arising from different ideological frameworks will 
lead to ambiguities in the social context with which individual actors interact. 
The ambiguity of institutional and symbolic environment is an important 
characteristic of a transition society. In our case, conflicts arise from the 
unfitness between a traditional party organ structure and the increasing 
environmental demands. Since the commercialization of media organizations 
does not involve fundamental changes in the ownership structure or the 
hierarchical system of the organizations, individual actors in these 
organizations are constantly faced with the problem of organizations' 
inflexibility and incompetence in dealing with market needs. 
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In the next section, I will briefly describe the background of this research, 
including Zhejiang Provincial TV Station, the Economic Life Channel and the 
advertising department in the Economic Life Channel. 
1.3 Zhejiang Provincial TV Station and the Economic Life Channel 
This case study takes place in one of China's biggest provincial TV stations, 
Zhejiang Provincial TV Station (ZJTV). 
One of the main reasons that I chose to study a provincial TV Station is that 
among the four administrative levels of China's media organizations, namely 
the state level, the provincial level, the city level and the county level, the 
structure of a provincial level TV station would demonstrate the most tensions 
between the central government's authoritarian control and local flexibility. 
State-level media outlets, the CCTVs, are situated right at the heart of the 
Party-state 's political power and thus reflect the dominant state control over 
propaganda tools. The CCTVs benefit from a government sanctioned national 
monopoly, but at the same time have little bargaining power under the 
government's political pressure. On the other hand, city and county level 
media outlets, being geographically and administratively remote from the state 
power centre, have much more flexibility in media programming and daily 
operations, but they reflect comparatively less tension between the Party-state's 
authoritarian control and the pressure of commercialization. A provincial level 
TV station, in this case, presents the most interesting level of analysis in the 
study of various conflicts in China's transitional media environment from the 
center to the periphery. 
ZJTV was established in October 1960 and was the first provincial TV station 
to set up specialized channels in China. There used to be three provincial TV 
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stations in the Zhejiang Province, namely Zhejiang Provincial TV Station, 
Zhejiang Education TV Station and Zhejiang Cable TV Station. Zhejiang 
Education TV was established by the Provincial Administration of Education in 
the early 80s as a medium for educational programs. Zhejiang Cable TV was 
established in the late 80s and used to broadcast mostly entertainment 
programs like soap operas and entertainment shows from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. 
The three TV stations were merged in the year of 2000 and renamed "Zhejiang 
Broadcasting and TV Group Corporation". ZJTV is now composed of one 
satellite TV channel, the Zhejiang Satellite TV Channel, and five specialized 
channels, namely the Qianjiang City Channel, the Economic Life Channel, the 
Education and Technology Channel, the Drama and Culture Channel and the 
Sport and Health Channel. This was the first merger among TV stations in 
China's national television history and was believed to have set the first step 
for bigger scale mergers among other television media outlets. 
According to an official report on the People's Daily on November 28, 2001, 
the audience coverage of ZJTV increased 30 million after the merger and 
reached a total of 670 million people, which was a 5.2% increase from the year 
of 2000. It became the second "most watched" TV station in China. ZJTV's 
advertising revenue was reported to have increased 83.72 million RMB in the 
months from January to October 2001 compared with last year, which was a 
20.6% increase. 
The merger was officially commented as a move which "professionalizes the 
medium by setting up specialized channels, strengthens media's function as 
guidance for public opinion and maximizes resources" ("People's Daily", 
November 28, 2001). 
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Below is ZJTV's organization chart. 
‘ Z J T V � 
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, i , , I ^ ^ ^ • . 
Admin Political Editorial Accounting Engineering Foreign 
Office Works Department Department Department Affairs 
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乂 乂 \ 二 • \ \ • 、 y ‘ 
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Satellite City Life Technology Channel Channel 
Chanel J Channel J [ Channel J Channel J J . 
The Structural separation of a provincial TV station into what seems to be 
independent channels has created certain amount of operational flexibility with 
the help of geographical and administrative distance from ZJTV's central 
leadership. However, even though the six specialized channels of ZJTV have 
their own editorial and management departments, they do not enjoy total 
autonomy over editorial or management decisions and are still heavily 
dependent on ZJTV's central leadership. 
My study is based on a two-month field trip in one of ZJTV's most successful 
channels, the Economic Life Channel (ELC). ELC mainly broadcast economic 
programs, including programs like economic news, stock market analysis, real 
estate market reports, public discussions on consumer rights, consumer 
experiences and etc. According to the figures from the Provincial 
Administration of Broadcasting, Film and Television, ELC covers 11 city areas 
and remains one of the most popular channels in the province. To establish a 
market oriented image, ELC uses slogans like: "We look at the society from the 
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economic angel and look at economy from the eyes of the people."; "We report 
the most up to date economic news and information and reveal the economic 
lives of the present day people" and "Economic Life Channel is a good advisor 
to people's economic lives and a communicator between the macro economic 
environment and people's day to day lives." As ELC faces the "new century, 
new economics and new life", it benefits from the Party-state's rhetoric of the 
media being a communication tool in people's lives in addition to its traditional 
propaganda role. However, even though ELC's audience orientation and 
economic approach are fully legitimized, the channel faces other tensions and 
conflicts. The tensions that it has to deal with are characterized as the conflicts 
between the media organization's eagerness to copy its west counterpart's 
commercial model and the "holdbacks" by the party organ's continued 
commandist and bureaucratic structure. These "holdbacks" are represented by 
the highly centralized decision-makings, ambiguities in the governing rules and 
the lack of a transparent or natural relationship between practices and 
governing premises. 
1.4 The Advertising Department 
As a specialized channel, ELC manages its own programming and advertising 
through the channel's programming department and advertising department. 
Both the programming department and the advertising department are under 
direct leadership of the channel director appointed by ZJTV's central office. 
The programming department has a general editorial office and several 
program groups for specific programs like the "Economic Life Channel News", 
‘‘The Stock Market" and "Fashion and Trend". The advertising department is 
made up of a total of fifteen people, including the managers and general staff 
for business development, technical support and accounting. Among the 
business staff，there are people who are specifically in charge of corporate 
accounts, advertising agencies and government liaisons. Below is the 
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organization chart of ELC and the advertising department. 
Channel Director 
Programming Department Advertising Department General Admin Office 
I 1 —' 
Specific Program Groups Manager/Asst. Manager 
— Business Staff 
^ ^ ^ Comnrate Accounts 
^ " f Advertising Agencies 
——( Government T .iaisnns 
Other Ar.f.niint<! 
— f Technical Staff 
— Accounting Staff 
The programming department in ELC functions as an operational organ and 
does not really enjoy autonomous editorial rights, since all new programs and 
changes in existing programs have to be approved by ZJTV's central office. 
On the other hand, the advertising department has gradually gained more 
bargaining power in the management structure and plays an increasingly 
important role in the daily operation and decision makings. This could be 
explained by the financial pressure which the media organization faces. As the 
financial needs get more pressing, the adverting department has slowly gained 
its unique position in the organizational structure. ELC's advertising 
department seldom deals with public service advertisements which are mostly 
handled by general editorial office. 
Although program scheduling has been traditionally, and still is supposedly, the 
responsibility of the programming department, the advertising department is 
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gradually gaining more says in the choices of TV programs, particularly prime 
time programs such as TV dramas. ELC has a program purchase group which 
is in charge of purchasing TV programs from other channels or outside 
producers. This program purchase group is now composed of three people, 
including the channel director, a representative from the programming 
department and a representative from the advertising department. With the 
increasing financial pressure, ELC's advertising department is not only able to 
talk the channel into buying more audience oriented programs which might 
traditionally cause concerns over their "socialist moral standards", but is also 
able to influence news production. 
In January 2002, ELC's news group produced a critical report on a local health 
product called "Brain Platinum"('W(ao Bai Jin”) on the product's alleged effect 
to improve mental sharpness. The report never appeared on TV. Since the 
manufacturer of "Brain Platinum" had been an important advertiser for ELC, 
the head of the advertising department called up the channel director and 
strongly recommended that they don't air the report. In fear of losing a big 
client and a considerably big amount of advertising revenue, the channel 
director decided to follow the economic interest and demanded that the news 
group freeze the critical report. This case is an important sign of the 
advertising department's increasing bargaining power as the economic force 
becomes increasingly stronger. It is also a good example of the various 
tensions and confusions which ELC experiences during the transition process. 
1.5 Methodology 
The data used for this qualitative study was collected during my two-month 
field trip in ZJTV from June to July 2002. The main research methods used in 
this study are participate observation, in-depth interview and content analysis. 
11 
I have designed this research into a three step process in order to find the 
answers to my research question. The first step is to review the institutional 
environment of ZJTV and the advertising department and illustrate the 
conflicts and tensions through content analysis of written regulations and rules 
in ZJTV. The second step is to look at how individual actors interact with 
environmental tensions through their strategic behaviors. To understand micro-
level strategic behaviors, I look at two questions. The first question is: how do 
individual actors view, understand and judge environmental tensions from the 
individual level? The second question is: how are strategic behaviors selected, 
performed and utilized by individual actors to solve environmental tensions 
under different circumstances? The third step of my research would be to 
identify, summarize and illustrate the patterns of micro-level behaviors in the 
interplay of actors, organizations and institutions in the transition process. 
In June 2002, I was introduced to ELC's advertising department as a summer 
intern student through a personal contact. Such personal introduction into an 
organization is a popular and widely sanctioned social practice in China. It not 
only enabled me to be accepted as a group member in the organization very 
quickly, but also saved me a lot of trouble of applying for official introduction 
through the organization's foreign affairs office as a Hong Kong student. The 
personal introduction allowed me to "join the team" more easily and I soon 
became good friends with everyone in the advertising department. Today, I 
still keep good personal contacts and exchange correspondence with most of 
the people in the advertising department. Such personal relationship not only 
enabled me to get a lot of insider information for my research, but also allowed 
me to verify some of the data after my field trip through follow-up phone calls 
and correspondence. 
During the two months period, I worked in the advertising department on a 
daily basis and was involved in both internal and external day to day operations. 
I attended internal meetings, helped prepare marketing materials and 
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coordinate between different departments. I was also very much involved in 
client relationship handlings and took part in many client negotiations and 
meetings on both formal and informal occasions. I believe my help was very 
much appreciated by the advertising department, since when I was leaving 
ELC, the channel director sincerely asked me to consider working there after 
my graduation. 
Participant observation was an importance source of my research data. Being 
an insider in the setting, I wrote detailed field notes everyday to record what I 
observed in the field. My observation mainly took place in the advertising 
department, but there has been some observation in other sections of ZJTV as 
well. In addition to documenting the daily routines and regular practices, my 
field observation was specially focused on non-routine practices and 
unexpected events. I have tried to balance my role as an insider as well as an 
outsider while recording my field observation. Besides field observation, I also 
collected a great amount of written materials including internal regulations and 
policies, handbooks, memorandums and marketing materials which I have used 
for content analysis. 
During the field trip, I did a total of fifteen in-depth interviews and my 
informants come from different units in ZJTV. The interviewees include staff 
from ELC's advertising department, the editorial department, director and 
deputy director of ELC and staff from other departments in ZJTV. Most 
interviews were conducted in unofficial settings outside the office, like over 
drinks, lunches or dinners during which time the informants felt relaxed. I have 
not used their real names in this study. 
During the interviews, the interviewees were not informed that they were 
helping with an organizational study or an academic research, instead, they 
were asked to help me with a school report as my internship assignment. I 
believe this would make the informants feel more relaxed and less concerned 
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when talking about some "sensitive" topics. I tried to conduct the interviews as 
friendly chats and mixed casual questions with the research questions. During 
the interviews, most of my informants were quite willing to talk, especially 
when complaining about the problems that they had to face in work. All 
interviews were recorded by handwritten notes. 
In order to make the data collected through interviews more reliable, I focused 
on the same kind of key questions during each interview. The key questions 
asked include: "Please briefly describe your job in ZJTV.’，； "What do you think 
of ZJTV's efforts in setting up specialized channels?"; "What do you think of 
the advertising department's role in ZJTV?"; "How do you think about the 
advertising practices in ZJTV?"; "What do you feel is the most difficult part of 
your job?"; "What is your working relationship with your manager/leader 
like?" and “What advice would you give to someone who wants to work in the 
advertising department?" 
I have mostly asked open questions during the interviews and asked that the 
informants give specific examples as they express their opinions. Therefore, I 
was not only able to understand the interviewees' views but also able to hear 
many "real life stories" of what was happening in the field. 
To make my analysis more valid and convincing, I have also tried to cross-
validate my research data from different sources. In this aspect, triangulation 
was done mainly through verifying the data with different research methods 
and different sources. I have tried to cross-exam the data I collected during 
participant observation with the data I used for content analysis. I have also 
tried to compare the different "versions" of the same story be asking my 
informants to describe and talk about the same case during interviews. Then of 
course, such triangulation is limited by the availability of my research data. In 





A NEO-INSTITUTIONAL-SOCIOLOGY APPROACH 
2.1. Transaction Cost and Organizational Mode 
Transaction cost economists believe that an organization, like a firm, is an 
alternative means of organizing transaction other than the market (R. Coase 
1960 & Williamson, 1985). Because of uncertainties caused by bounded 
rationality and opportunism, "transaction cost" explains the shift of a 
transaction from the market into the firm, and it also explains the organization 
form. "Bounded rationality" refers to the inability of economic actors to 
anticipate properly the complex chain of contingencies. "Opportunism" refers 
to the assumption that economic agents are guided by considerations of self-
interest to make allowance for strategic behaviors (Granovetter 1992). 
Williamson (1988) believes that internal organizational forms, compared to 
open markets, have their advantage in economizing bounded rationality and 
opportunism, thus reducing uncertainties while at the same time adjusting to 
changing market circumstances in an adaptive manner. Granovetter argues that 
organizational forms observed in any situations deal most efficiently with the 
cost of economic transactions which is internalized for two reasons: to expand 
the limit of bounded rationality and to curb opportunism. 
However, Powell (1991) thinks that this dichotomy of markets and hierarchies 
does not provide an adequate account for the explanation of many 
organizational problems encountered in developing economies and researchers 
also need to notice organizational practices and arrangements which focus on 
the "lateral or horizontal patterns of exchange", the interdependent flows of 
resources and the reciprocal lines of communication. 
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Therefore, Powell put forward an alternative framework of "market, 
hierarchies and networks", focusing on the network forms of organization in 
economic transactions. In this framework, Powell argues that transactions 
occur neither through discrete exchanges nor by administrative fait, but 
through "networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential and 
mutually supportive actions". 
2.2 Organizations and Institutions in Transition Societies 
D. North (1990) and many other neoclassical institutional economists believe 
that the basic source of institutional change is the fundamental and persistent 
change in relative prices which leads one or both parties in a transaction to 
perceive that they could be better off under alternative contractual and 
institutional arrangements. This perception of institutional change is based on 
North's transaction cost economics theory which is largely established on the 
western history of economy. North believes that a prevailing contractual form 
is one that minimizes transaction cost of contracting, and any factor affecting 
contracting parties' cost-benefit calculation or their relative bargaining power 
can lead to innovation in the contractual form on the condition that the factor 
has a strong enough effect to change both parties' "incentive sets". Similarly, 
Williamson (1996) views institutional innovations as adaptations of an 
institution in response to disturbances in the environment. 
R. Scott (1995) explains institutionalization in his three pillar institutional 
theory. He defines "institutions" as "multifaceted systems" consisting of 
cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that provide 
stability and meaning to social behaviors. "Organizations" are viewed in his 
theory as adaptive and organic systems which are affected by the social 
characteristics of their participants as well as the varied pressures imposed by 
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their environment (Scott 1995). Scott further explains that organizations are 
deeply embedded in institutional contexts. A given organization is supported 
and constrained by institutional forces and may incorporate institutional 
elements in the forms of cultures, structures or routines into its own system. 
Scott also argues that although organizations confront and are shaped by 
institutions, the institutional systems are not necessarily "unified to coherent". 
My analysis in this study is based on this theoretical view of interaction 
between institutions and organizations. 
A variety of researchers who study organizations and institutions in transition 
contexts have explained the effects of environmental complexity, instability 
and inconsistency on organizations. For example, Meyer and Scott (1994) 
propose that organizations confronting more complex and fragmented 
environments, such as multiple authorities, would develop more complex and 
elaborated structures which lead to constant complexity in the work process. 
Powell (1988) argues that organizations that are located in environments in 
which conflicting demands are made upon them will be especially likely to 
generate complex organizational structures with "disproportionately large 
administrative components and boundary-spanning units". Scott believes that 
while some institutional changes can be seen as coercive processes, it is 
important to understand how organizational actors enact the changes and the 
interplay of "bottom-up" or "top-down" explanations of institutionalization 
(Johnson et al 2000). 
The neo-institutional theory believes that just as institutions constitute 
organizations, they also constitute the appropriate ways of acting, including 
acts that are responses to institutional pressures. Strategies which may be 
appropriate in one kind of industry or field may be prohibited in another. 
Tactics that can be successfully pursued in one setting may be inconceivable in 
another. Not only structures, but also strategies, are institutionally shaped. 
Some researches have shown that hybrid organizations reflect the conflicts in 
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their environments by attempting to incorporate some features that are 
consistent with both. These organizations respond by combining practices from 
the both sectors. Hybrid units also adopt conflicting goals and somewhat 
inconsistent treatment practices. Conflicts in the environment are reflected in 
the structures and practices of these organizations. These researches shed some 
light on our understanding of the interplay of organizations and institutions in 
transition societies. 
There have also been many studies on organizations' strategic responses to 
institutions. Edelman (1992) argues that laws which contain vague to 
controversial language, laws that regulate organizational procedures more than 
the substantive results of those procedures and laws that have weak 
enforcement mechanisms leave more room for organizational mediation than 
laws that are more specific, substantive and backed by strong enforcement. 
Oliver (1991) uses institutional and resources dependency theory to explain an 
organization's strategic responses to institutional process in the context of 
differing institutional factors. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) argue that 
radical change is more likely to happen when there is loose coupling within 
institutions and when there are less "well-defined means" to preserve the 
dominant templates. Kondra and Hinings (1998) predict that changes are more 
likely to occur in institutional environments where there is more, rather than 
less, diversity or higher influence from other organizational fields. 
Johnson et al (2000) argue in their study of the privatization process that during 
the transitional process where two institutional templates coexist and compete 
for legitimacy in the actors' eyes, the old template is deeply "embedded, taken 
for granted and largely mindlessly enacted." However, as the transition 
proceeds, the new institutional template and its implications can be “mindftilly 
anticipated". 
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To summarize, neo-institutionalism emphasizes the active interplay between 
organizational forms and the institutional environment. On the one hand, 
organization structures are shaped and reflect the institutional environment, 
while on the other hand, organizational actors are able to strategically deal with 
institutional pressures. My analysis of the interactive relationship between a 
transitional organization and its institutional environment in this study is based 
on such perception. 
2.3 Studies on China's Media Reform 
Studies on China's media reform broadly fall into two areas: the first area being 
studies on the macro-level environmental changes and media structural 
changes, and the second area being studies on the micro-level strategies in 
solving various tensions and conflicts in transitional media organizations. 
Most studies on China's media reform believe that the critical conflicts in the 
post-Mao era arise from the interlocking forces of Party control and market 
demands (Lee 2000, Chan 1993 & Zhao 1998). China's unique approach to 
economic development in trying to transform a command economy into a 
market based economy has brought about an economic liberalization without 
political democratization. The introduction of market mechanism into the 
media system resulted in a proliferation of new media forms and an increasing 
variety of cultural and entertainment forms with reduced propaganda contents. 
However, this does not mean that media outlets have changed their roles as 
propaganda tools. Some researchers (He 2000, Zhao 1998) have correctly 
pointed out that the promotion of consumerism and media's public service 
function is no less ideological than the promotion of class struggle during the 
Mao era. It is merely a shift of the Party's political indoctrination towards 
more subtle forms of ideological domination. He (2000) argues that in the 
reform era, media acts as a "Party Publicity Inc." in helping to legitimate the 
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Party-state's leadership. 
The commercialization process of China's media structure is described as a 
complicated process of "challenges, accommodations and containments" (Lee 
2000). There have been many empirical studies on China's transitional media 
organizations which focus on micro level strategies in dealing with these 
challenges and conflicts. There are studies on how the introduction of 
advertising into a media outlet affected various aspects of the organization in 
an uneven manner, which resulted in a "tug of war" between market forces and 
political forces (He 2000). Pan (2000) studied how individual journalists were 
able to manage the tensions between economic reform and political control 
through "improvising" certain strategies which could later become routine 
practices. There have also been studies on particular strategies, like the 
separation of front and back stage operations in state owned media 
organizations to maximize resources and increase flexibility when competing 
with joint venture organizations (Xu 2000). 
In short, these studies of China's media reform try to answer one fundamental 
problem: Where is China's media structure heading with the interlocking forces 
from the market and the Party? In this study, I try to look at the transition 
process of China's media structure from the economic-sociology perspective 
and attempt to explain some patterns of adaptation in a transitional media 
organization. To do so, I draw from previous studies on transition societies and 
organizations and put forward some patterns of adaptive behaviors which I 
expect in the transitional context. I then try to illustrate and explain each 
behavioral pattern with my research data. My analysis intends to create a 
micro and macro linkage in China's media studies by looking at the mechanism 
of how the market logic is incorporated into a party organ structure. 
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2.4 "Strategic Adaptation" 
Although neo-institutional theorists acknowledge the significance of individual 
behaviors and the process through which actors are involved in institutional 
changes, there has been little effort to make "neo-institutionalism's micro 
foundations explicit" (DiMaggio & Powell 1991). 
Organizations can be seen as meaning systems that develop normative rules to 
define values and activity scripts which are important mechanisms for 
producing stability (Scott 1994b). Institutions can be seen as sets of rules and 
symbolic constructions which constitute the organizing principles and available 
for organizations and individuals to elaborate (Friedland & Alford, 1991). So 
how do organizations structure themselves to operate rationally when they are 
faced with uncertainties in the institutional environment? Neo-economists 
argue that the central problem of economic organization is adaptation, or in 
other words, adaptation capacity. "Adaptation" refers to the constructive and 
dialectical relationship between an organization and its institutional 
environment. Neo-economic-sociology, in combining an economic and 
sociology view, sees an economic action also as a social action and believes 
that actors are socially situated and economic institutions are also socially 
constructed. 
I adopt this neo-economic-sociology approach to look at the interplay between 
a given organization and its institutional environment in a transitional context. 
To do so, I put forward the concept of "strategic adaptation". "Strategic 
adaptation" refers to the process through which certain behaviors are 
strategically selected, implemented and utilized in a transitional context with 
the purpose to adapt to environmental changes. There are both micro and 
macro levels of the adaptation process. The micro-level process refers to 
individual strategic behaviors in a specific context, while the macro-level 
process refers to organizational level efforts in adapting to institutional 
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environment. The concept of "strategic adaptation" thus creates a link between 
the micro and macro level analysis of the adaptation process by explaining how 
individual actors interact with an organization and its institutional environment 
and how individual strategic behaviors help solve tensions on the organization 
level in a transitional environment. 
I borrow Barney (1997)，s definition of "strategy" and view it as a pattern of 
decisions and actions that enables an individual or an organization to improve 
or maintain its performance. The traditional "SWOT" analysis thinks that a 
strategy in a given situation should be based on assessments of the strengths, 
weakness, opportunities and threats. Therefore, I also believe that a good 
strategy will neutralize threats, exploit opportunities, capitalize strengths and 
avoid weakness. 
By taking the neo-economic-sociology approach, I view business strategies 
also as intended social behaviors. I see individuals not only as agents who take 
part in rational and efficient transaction arrangements but also as 
knowledgeable social actors situated in social relations. In this study, I hope to 
link the micro and macro processes of a transition process by combining the 
economic and sociology perspectives. 
2.5 Behavioral Patterns of "Strategic Adaptation" 
There are literatures in neo-institutional studies which explain how the 
presence of conflicting rules opens institutional space for individual discretion, 
strategic behavior and choices. As Swidler (1986) observes, the interpretation 
of cultural rule systems should lead us to expect not "passive cultural dopes", 
but rather active and sometime skilled user of culture. 
In explaining "strategic adaptation" in a transitional media organization, this 
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study tries to identify and illustrate some behavioral patterns of individual 
strategic approach in dealing with institutional inconsistencies and look at how 
the presence of conflicting rules could open space for strategic behaviors. Even 
though the behavioral patterns discussed in this study have been developed 
from previous literatures on transition societies and organizations from 
institutional and sociology studies, I try to explain the behavioral patterns from 
a new perspective and in a more categorized manner. The purpose of this study 
is, on the one hand, to provide a new micro-macro linked angle in looking at 
China's media reform by categorizing and illustrating some adaptive 
behavioral patterns in the transition process, and on the other hand, to enrich 
transition society studies with China's media reform experience. 
Since we believe that strategies used to deal with institutional pressures are 
shaped and defined by the institutional environment where social actors are 
situated, therefore, the coexistence of different institutional logics in a 
transition context and the ambiguities in the institutional environment would 
shape the strategies which knowledgeable actors perform. In this study, we find 
that many strategies actors adopt to cope with external environmental pressures 
are facilitated, to various extents, by the existence of institutional 
inconsistencies and ambiguities. The existence of ambiguities and conflicts in 
the symbolic and regulative environment does not slow down the transition 
process, but on the contrary, provides institutional space for organizational 
actors to perform strategic and adaptive behaviors in dealing with institutional 
conflicts. Therefore, the existence of environmental ambiguities serves as a 
necessary condition in providing a "buffer area" in the transition process, 
which helps transitional organizations adapt to environmental changes and thus 
smoother! the transition process. 
In this study, we are looking at cases where institutional conflicts do not 
necessarily limit social actors' strategic choices, but on the contrary, facilitate 
some boundary spanning strategies in satisfying different institutional demands. 
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As I explain and illustrate the various patterns of strategic adaptation, it is not 
difficult to see that the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the institutional 
environment actually help provide individual actors with institutional space to 
legitimize some boundary activities. This explains why the existence of 
institutional disagreements and ambiguities has its positive social impact in a 
transition society like China. 
To illustrate the behavioral patterns that we expect from existing transition 
society studies, I have categorized these patterns into the three aspects of 
strategic adaptation, i.e. structural adaptation, symbolic adaptation and 
reciprocal behaviors. 
Structural adaptation refers to strategic behaviors in broadening or spanning an 
organization's structural boundaries in the transitional context. In this study, 
structural adaptation mainly refers to the approach to strategically decouple the 
values of organization structure and the values governing daily activities in 
order to adopt the most effective institutional logic to satisfy environmental 
demands. Such micro-level strategies in turn increase the flexibility of an 
organization and thereby enable the organization to adapt to the changing 
environment. Under the category of structural adaptation, I identified three 
behavioral patterns from the case study which I summarize as spanning of 
space, spanning of practice and spanning of identity. 
Symbolic adaptation refers to strategic behaviors in articulating or bridging 
"old" and "new" value systems in a transition symbolic environment. In an 
ambiguous institutional environment, individual actors tend to draw on norms 
and governing values from the old symbolic framework and adapt them to the 
new context through interpretative discourses, so that the familiar meaning 
system is used to justify activities in satisfying new institutional demands. 
Under the category of symbolic adaptation, I identified three behavioral 
patterns from my case study which I summarize as boundary blurring, 
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symbolic packaging and ideological framing. 
Reciprocal behaviors refer to individual strategic behaviors of networking or 
personalized approaches based on informal favor exchanges in order to 
maximize resources and reduce uncertainties in the transition institutional 
environment. In my case study, I identified two behavioral patterns of 
reciprocal behaviors, i.e. emergent networking and prospective networking. 
In the following chapters, Chapter 3 describes the transition institutional 
environment of ZJTV in the reform era by explaining how old and new 
institutional logics coexist, so that we understand the media organization's 
"playing field" in a broad picture. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I will examine the 
empirical data and illustrate how each behavioral pattern of strategic adaptation 
works in a transitional media organization like ZJTV. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS IN A TRANSITIONAL MEDIA 
ENVIRONEMENT 
3.1 Partial Reform and Duality of Institutional Demands 
Socialist economy researchers believe that the fundamental economic and 
organizational problems in socialist economy lie in two areas: coordination and 
incentive. The coordination problem stems from the inefficiency of using 
central planning and bureaucratic control to coordinate economic activities 
(Ericson 1991). Because socialist state has multiple and conflicting objectives 
such as developing the economy, creating wealth and maintaining fiill 
employment and social services, it lacks reliable information about the true 
capability of state owned enterprises and planners depend heavily on the 
enterprises' performance during the previous year. Therefore, managers in 
state-owned enterprises have little incentive to maximize profits, since 
overfulfillment will result in upward adjustment of the target of next year 
(Granick 1990，Peng 2000). As a result, state-owned enterprises managers 
typically bargain with the state for a performance target as low as possible, and 
failure to perform does not create a threat to these managers, thus creating "soft 
budget constraints" and further reduces managers' incentives to perform 
efficiently (Peng & Heath, 1996; Tan & Peng, 1998b). 
In Komai (1989)'s organizational framework of socialist economics, he sees 
"shortage economy" and "soft budget constraints' as unavoidable under the 
condition of socialist central planning and as the fundamental reasons of failure 
of partial reform in socialist societies. Komai argues that the hybrid economy 
resulting from a partial reform operates in a condition of "dual dependence": 
dependence on both vertical bureaucratic and horizontal market co-ordinations. 
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The situation where the central government, owner of the state enterprises, has 
other social and political considerations and interests besides profitability leads 
to conflicts. The dilemma of having to deal with both financial and non-
financial interests of socialist enterprises softens the budget constraints, and 
thus weakens the incentives to produce economic outputs. Komai's 
explanation of the problems in state-owned enterprises gives us some light in 
understanding our case of China's media organizations, even though they have 
fundamental differences. 
In China's media reform, development has been disjunctive in nature. The goal 
is to achieve economic modernization without yielding political control (Chan 
1993). It is believed that by rationalizing and redistribution with a correct mix 
of central planning and market competition, socialist economy would be more 
effective and productive. It is not surprising that the idea of employing 
competitive business goals was very alien to media organization managers who 
had neither pressure nor incentive to perform financially well other than mere 
propaganda plan fulfillment during the classical socialist era. Centralized 
media planning and political and bureaucratic control, which lead to 
inflexibility of the media outlets, apparently hold back the organizations' 
efforts to try to fit into market competition. Although the introduction of 
performance based contractual arrangements may be useful to create incentive 
to some extent, it does not completely change the way in which China's media 
organizations operate. 
China's media outlets have been structured as an integral part of the communist 
policy system (Chang 1989). The hierarchical structure of media industry is a 
vital instrument of policy implementation by the Communist Party. The media 
system is an important part of the Party-state's infrastructure for ideological 
indoctrination, and media is considered a propaganda tool and a party organ for 
transmission of party policies under the command of the party master (Lee 
1990). China's TV stations, like other media outlets, are structured under two 
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interlocking systems: the administrative system of the state and the ideological 
system of the party. A provincial TV station like ZJTV is under both the 
administrative control of the Provincial Administration of Radio, Film & 
Television and the ideological control of the provincial party committee's 
propaganda unit. 
Under the party organ structure, all media outlets have allocated funds to 
perform their propaganda tasks. But starting in the early 80s, China's media 
outlets have been gradually required to be financially independent by soliciting 
their own advertising revenue. The introduction of advertising and market 
mechanism into the media outlets brought noticeable changes in media 
operations and innovations in media contents. 
The central government's reform policy to transform a media organization into 
a profitable business operator has revealed great deal of institutional 
inconsistencies in the transition process. ZJTV, previously a government 
subsidized party organ, is shaped by institutional constraints which stem from 
the Communist Party's ideology governing a propaganda tool. In a traditional 
socialist government organ, actors are used to deal with highly centralized 
decision-makings and abstract and vague governing rules and premises, the 
execution of which relies heavily on human interpretation. 
In our case, the institutional changes are initiated and realized through coercive 
forces in a top down manner, and both old and new institutional demands come 
from a highly centralized authoritarian power. The incentives underlying such 
changes in the institutional environment are different from those initiated by 
transaction costs in the market. Therefore, we need to note the uniqueness of 
the institutional context of China' partial reform and carefully adapt the 
western institutional theories to our case. 
Below, I have tried to summarize the characteristics of media structure in a 
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transition institutional environment by comparing a transitional model with an 
absolute propaganda model and an absolute commercial model. We need to 
note that this is a highly simplified chart and a lot of alternative models exist 
between the two extreme models. 
A Comparison of Media Structure in Different Institutional Environments 
Propasanda Model Transitional Model Commercial Model 
Planned Economy Market Economy Market Economy 
Government Ownership Government Ownership Private Ownership 
Centralized Authority Centralized Authority Editorial Autonomy 
Financially Dependent Financially Independent Financially Independent 
Government Propaganda Government Propaganda Free Press 
Hierarchical Bureaucracy Hierarchical Bureaucracy Market driven 
Politically Oriented Politically Oriented Consumer Oriented 
As we see from the above chart, the transitional model of a media structure is 
characterized by the coexistence of government planning and new market 
incentives, which results in the paradox of having to serve the government's 
propaganda needs and the new financial needs at the same time. 
In the next section, I will analyze the regulative structure of ZJTV in order to 
illustrate the duality of old and new institutional demands faced by the 
transitional organization in media reform era. New institutional demands 
characterized in the "Financial Responsible Contract" have been eagerly 
introduced into the party organ while the old institutional demands 
characterized in the "Propaganda Work Guidebook" continue to function as 
powerful constraints. 
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3.1.1 “Old” Institutional Demands - The "Propaganda Work Guidebook" 
Every employee in ELC, from the director to junior clerks, has a handbook 
called the "Propaganda Work Guidebook" (the "Guidebook") which describes 
the basic rules for working in a propaganda organization. It is important that 
these rules are followed strictly, because a minor, even though mindless, 
political mistake in the propaganda work can lead to serious consequences, not 
only for the individual but also for the whole channel. This was the 
educational lesson I got on my first day in ELC, and the Guidebook was the 
first written material that was handed to me. I was asked to study these rules 
carefully and remember them by heart. 
On the first page of the Guidebook, it states the "three disciplines and eight 
attentions" {''san da ji lu, ba xiang zhu yi”，which was a famous slogan by the 
Communist Party back in the revolutionary era) of the propaganda work in 
ZJTV. 
The "Three Disciplines" include: 
1. To strictly keep in line with the Party; 
2. To strictly follow the directions from the Party on all propaganda works; 
3. To be on time and on post. 
The "Eight Attentions" include: 
1. Pay attention to whether reports on the activities of provincial leaders and 
central government leaders in Zhejiang Province have been reviewed and 
approved according to procedures; 
2. Pay attention to whether reports on special units and foreign affairs have 
been reviewed and approved as regulated; 
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3. Pay attention to whether publicity of accidents, mega events and disasters 
have been authorized; 
4. Pay attention to reports on sensitive topics and critical reports are accurate 
and appropriate ； 
5. Pay attention to whether reports on jurisdiction organizations and court 
cases meet special requirements and jurisdiction procedures; 
6. Pay attention to whether arrangements of news and other programs can 
reveal the contemporary broadcasting thoughts; 
7. Pay attention to whether reports on important talks and commentaries on 
public affairs are precise, clear and vivid; 
8. Pay attention to whether special instructions from superior authority have 
received full attention. (-- from ZTV (1996) No. 131 Document) 
~ News Censorship & Programming Policy 
The specific instructions on news production and program censorship 
described in the Guidebook reflect the Party's dominant ideology in using a TV 
station as a propaganda tool and a medium for transmission of party policies 
and political agendas. The first chapter of the Guidebook describes regulations 
on "how to correctly grasp public opinion orientations". Under the principle of 
"reporting truthfully", the specific requirements are actually "to report from 
proper angels in order to avoid negative effects"; "to be very careful with 
critical reports and get approvals from governing authority for critical reports 
on the government's functional departments" and to "strictly follow the 
superior authority's propaganda words". In short, the Guidebook basically says 
that there should be no critical reports unless they are official sanctioned, 
especially when these reports are related to sensitive social problems, 
government policies, reform measures and foreign affairs. Statistics and the 
central government leaders' visits to Zhejiang have to be also reported 
"positively". There is even a special requirement to "mainly propagate the 
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leaders' activities on how they investigate situations and solve social 
problems." Furthermore, special attention should be paid to "whether the 
leaders' names are reported correctly and in the right sequence." 
~ Propaganda Quality Responsible Contract 
ZJTV uses a program censorship procedure called the "three levels and four 
censorships" (“san ji si shen”\ which means that all TV programs, whether 
locally produced or purchased, have to be censored by a censorship group 
consisting of the program supervisor (“hn mu zu zhang”), the programming 
department head who is also called the general editor (“zong bian") and the 
station head. All programs are carefully reviewed in light of their topics, 
scripts and contents. Every month, each program group submits to the general 
programming department its program planning which has to be approved by 
the program supervisor, the department head and the station head. For some 
special programs like the celebration of the national holidays, it is necessary 
that the programs be fully reviewed and approved by the station's Art 
Committee which is in charge of the artistic and moral standards of the 
programs. In addition to censorship on current productions, there is a 
regulation called "re-censorship", which requires that all programs re-broadcast 
after a certain period of time be re-censored, especially for the programs 
produced over five years ago, produced during politically sensitive periods or 
produced during periods when leadership was going through personnel change. 
ZJTV has a duty station leader who is responsible for monitoring news 
programs on a daily basis and making sure that no "mistake" has been made. ~ 
(ZJTV (1995) No. 140 Document) 
In order to ensure program quality and to make certain that propaganda work 
maintains both "political" and "artistic" standards, ZJTV has adopted a 
"propaganda quality responsible contract" mechanism. The purpose of this 
contractual arrangement is to promote programs which receive compliments 
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from both the audience and the leaders, i.e. programs which are both 
entertaining and politically correct. In ZJTV, all programs are evaluated based 
on three criteria: their "moral standard" (''si xiang xing''), "artistic standard" 
(“少/ shu xing'') and "entertaining standard" {''guan shang xing”). The 
evaluation process includes program evaluation, technical evaluation, audience 
rating and a final grading by the station's Program Quality Evaluation 
Committee. The programs are then classified from Grade A to Grade D based 
on the three criteria Csan xing"). For example, promotional programs should 
be classified as Grade D programs and can not be broadcasted. Among the 
three criteria, "moral standard" refers to the political criterion of the 
propaganda work and is therefore more critical than the other two criteria. 
There are a lot more pluses of pints in relation to the "moral standard" of a 
program than the other two standards. For example, if a program is "praised by 
the central government leaders or provincial leaders" and it has "positive 
nationwide impact", there will be a plus of 5 to 8 points out of the total 20 
points. If a program attracts the government leaders' attention, there will be an 
additional 2 to 4 points. If a program "does not grasp the political orientation 
correctly" and is criticized by the superior authority, 8 to 15 points will be 
deducted and the program cannot be graded higher than Grade C. 
Program grading is closely tied up with the financial funding for program 
groups as well as personal bonuses. Programs which receive good scores will 
be graded as “focal point programs" Czhong dian Ian mu”), and they can 
receive additional funds and get better program slots. Grade A programs can 
get an additional "activity fund" of RMB50,000, and Grade B programs can get 
an additional "activity fund" of RMB20,000. People working in the program 
group which has the most "focal point programs" will receive an additional 
10% of their quarterly bonus, while those who work in program groups that do 
not meet the target of having a "focal point program" will have their quarterly 
bonus deducted by 10%. 
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This responsible contractual arrangement for program quality, established 
under the Party-state's propaganda ideology, functions to legitimize and 
strengthen the mechanism which serves the traditional institutional logic in the 
media organization-- the party logic. Social actors, through observable and 
recurrent activities in the institutional setting, construct a "cognitive schema" 
which informs the "appropriateness" of behaviors in a particular context 
(Barley & Tolbert 1997). However, through both mindless and mindful actions, 
social actors on the one hand are "captured" and conform to the institutional 
constraints under the traditional party logic, but on the other hand play an 
active role in constantly creating and amending the traditional rules. 
3.1.2 “New” Institutional Demands - The Financial Responsible Contract 
In the media reform, China's media organizations are faced with new 
institutional demands to become financially independent in addition to their 
traditional propaganda tasks. Media outlets are exposed to the business world 
and have to leam market rules through a process of commercialization. To cope 
with the financial pressure, most media outlets have established a financial 
responsible contractual system, a "capitalist style" punish and reward system, 
to incorporate market mechanism into their organizational structures. ZJTV 
was among the first TV stations in China to establish a complete and well-
functioning financial contractual system. 
~ Revenue Target 
ELC has an internal document called "The Notice of Economic Management 
Target for Economic Life Channel in 2002" (the “Notice"). This Notice is an 
important directive from ZJTV's central management office and it describes in 
detail the financial target which ELC has to fulfill in the year of 2002. 
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On the first page of the Notice, it says: "Preconditioned by insisting on the 
correct public opinion orientation and channel professionalism, and based on 
the principle of being cost effective, a three year development plan is made to 
increase the economic performance of Economic Life Channel." This three 
year economic plan requires ELC to be: (a) totally self-reliant in terms of profit 
and loss in the first year; (b) able to submit 15% of its total revenue to ZJTV's 
central office as management fund in the second year and (c) able to submit 
30% of its total revenue to ZJTV's central office in the third year. It is stated 
that the purpose of this Notice is to help the Channel "maximize its profit."(--
ZTV Group (2002) No. 48 document) 
The revenue target�“chuang shou zhi biao”�for ELC in 2002 has three 
different levels. The first level is the basic "appraisal target" of 
RMB26.2million. The second level is the "ensured target" ofRMB 36.2million. 
The third level is the "approachable target" of RMB39.2million. ZJTV's 
central office insists that all channels must improve their economic 
performance every year, and therefore the financial quota is increased each year. 
ELC's advertising revenue in the year of 2001 was RMB20million, therefore 
their basic target for 2002 is increased to RMB26million. According to the 
channel director, fulfilling the revenue target "has never been an easy job". 
The Notice requires that all the operational cost incurred by the channel should 
be covered by itself, and no government subsidies will be allocated. According 
to the Notice, ELC can use up to RMB20.5million as its “propaganda budget", 
which includes RMB14.5million for propaganda programs, RMB5.5million for 
equipments and RMB500,000 for various "business activities". 
~ Employment Terms and Performance Based Job Allowances 
With changes in the institutional environment, the employment structure of 
ZJTV is slowly changing as well. Employees in ZJTV are traditionally called 
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"national cadres" ("gwo jia gan bu") which are professional titles associated 
with certain social status and job benefits exclusively for government 
employed party organ workers. It also means life-long employment by the 
government. During the media reform, such life-long employment is gradually 
changed to a market based employment contractual system. In the current 
transition stage, three forms of employment coexist in ELC. There are "formal 
workers", "contractual workers" and "temporary workers". Formal workers 
refer to those employed under the traditional socialist "national cadre" system, 
while contractual and temporary workers are both employed under the new 
contractual system, be it short term or long term. 
Despite the differences in employment terms, all workers in ELC are entitled to 
performance based job allowances. The Notice regulates that if the channel 
achieves its basic target revenue of RMB26.2million in the year of 2002, all 
employees are entitled to an annual bonus of RMB42,000, a handsome amount 
of income compared to local income levels. If the channel achieves its second 
level revenue target of RMB36.2million, 7% of the exceeded amount will be 
allocated as employee bonuses. If the channel achieves its third revenue target 
of RMB39.2million, 9% of the exceeded amount will be allocated to 
employees. 
There are special bonus arrangements for senior level managers including the 
channel director, deputy director and the advertising department head. 
According to the Notice, each of them will get an additional of RMB80,000 for 
achieving the basic revenue target and another percentage of the channel's 
revenue for achieving the other two targets. Besides financial encouragement, 
performance is also linked with the “official cadre post rank" Cgan bu gang 
wei xi shu''), a criterion in calculating the salary level for "national cadres". If 
the channel does not achieve its basic revenue target, the “official cadre post 
rank" of senior level managers including the channel leaders will be lowered, 
which links the economic performance with the political performance of the 
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"propaganda workers". 
3.2 Ambiguities and Conflicts 
To summarize the above, I have described in detail how the traditional 
propaganda demands and the new market demands coexist in ELC, so that we 
have a clearer view of the tensions and conflicts which individual actors have 
to deal with through strategic behaviors. Below, I will further elaborate the 
ambiguities and conflicts which arise from the duality of institutional demands. 
Even with pressing market demands and the introduction of market mechanism, 
ELC still functions under a hierarchical and bureaucratic organizational 
structure with a highly centralized decision-making system and the lack of 
transparent job responsibilities. Communication only happens in a top-down 
model and decision-makings often appear arbitrary. The highly authoritarian 
organizational structure of ELC represents a traditional model of media 
organization as a propaganda organ, and the rules described in the "Propaganda 
Work Guidebook" are typical guiding rules for such government organs. 
Furthermore, ELC's leadership is highly paternalistic with a structural context 
of centralization, low formalization and non-complexity (Westwood 1997). 
ELC's organizational structure carries values such as social hierarchies, 
didactic leadership, disciplines and control, centralized authority and political 
manipulation. Organizational behaviors in ELC are largely shaped by these 
values. Decisions are only made at the very top level, and daily operations like 
programming, budgeting and job allocation are highly controlled. It is in the 
top-down communication pattern that all government policies and local 
policies are transmitted. For the past twenty years since ZJTV was established, 
the authoritarian organizational structure has been effective in keeping the 
media outlet a pure "mouthpiece". 
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Meyer & Rowan (1977) argue that organizations which devise structures that 
conform closely to institutional requirements "maximize their legitimacy and 
increase their resources and survival capabilities." Interestingly, in our case, 
organizations are not selected by the institutional environment for survival on 
the basis of fitness between organizational forms and environmental demands. 
In China's transitional media environment, media organizations have retained 
their traditional hierarchical structures due to the continuing pressure from the 
traditional propaganda demands. Therefore, the new market demands have to 
be dealt with in highly-centralized bureaucracies which apparently lack the 
efficiency or the flexibility to cope with market needs. 
The duality of institutional constraints leads to ambiguities in the governing 
rules and also the linkage between governing premises and organizational 
activities. What used to be the set of rules now becomes a set of rules, and 
alternatives become possibilities. The organization established to conform to 
old institutional demands now finds itself in a position of having to satisfy new 
institutional demands with an "old" body. 
During my field trip in ELC, I observed some patterns of strategic behaviors 
which individual actors perform in coping with the conflicts between a 
traditional media structure and the new market demands. Such individual level 
approaches have helped the media organization adapt to the changes in the 
institutional environment. This process of strategic adaptation which is initiated 
by interest-driven individual behaviors increases the adaptability of an 
organization in the transitional social context. I believe that understanding the 
process of strategic adaptation is important to our understanding of how the 
micro and macro processes of adaptation are linked in a transition context. In 
the next three chapters, I will analyze some behavioral patterns in three aspects 
of strategic adaptation and illustrate how I expect, examine and explain each 




DECOUPLING OF ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
4.1 Structural Adaptation in a Transitional Context 
Structural adaptation refers to strategic behaviors in an organization which 
broaden or span the organization's structural boundaries in the transitional 
context. Since we believe that an organization's structural boundaries are 
shaped by institutional demands and that such structural boundaries confine 
organizational activities, structural adaptation therefore refers to the approach 
to strategically decouple the values of organizational structure and the values 
governing daily activities in order to adopt the most effective institutional logic 
to satisfy different environmental demands. 
Decoupling between governance systems and organizational forms is 
repeatedly found in studies of organizations (e. g. March & Olsen, 1989; Orton 
& Weick, 1990; Weick, 1979 & 2001). Some studies on transitional 
organizations show that the resilience of an organization is increased when the 
organizational form or structure conforms closely to institutional requirements 
and if its governance and activities are decoupled from the structure. The 
resilience of the organization is further increased if the values of the 
organization, i.e. its ideology, are consistent with institutional logic but are 
ambiguous enough to allow for "diversity of potential resources" to be 
connected to the organization (Johnson et al 2000). 
Myers and Rowan (1977) argue that whereas tight coupling of structure to 
activities is useful for organizations for their technical performance, 
organizations responding to institutional demands are better served if they 
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decouple structures from activities. This argument is based on the assumption 
that institutional rules often conflict with technical requirements or that the 
institutional rules are themselves in conflict. They also argue that organizations 
which devise structures that conform closely to institutional requirements 
"maximize their legitimacy and increase their resources and survival 
capabilities". 
"Loose coupling" refers to the situation where features of an open system are 
weakly interdependent, "probabilistically rather than deterministically related", 
and that the values characterizing one system component set only modest 
constraints on the values that may be assumed by others (Scott 1986). 
Consequently, instead of having simple, mechanic and unidirectional causal 
relations, components of an open system interact with each other within the 
“loop connections". By decoupling between activities and organizational 
structure, I refer to those organizational behaviors which intend to avoid a 
causal relationship between the values characterizing organizational form and 
daily practices, which consequently leads to the openness for disagreement 
between values of organizational structure and organizational practices. 
To explain the patterns of structural adaptation, I use the concept of 
"institutional space" to describe the boundaries defining the old and new 
institutions as an indicator for institutional change. It refers to the capacity of 
an institution to instigate and support "out-of-frame" practices (Goffman 1974). 
Institutional boundaries are not static but are repeatedly negotiated and 
interpreted, which leads to changes in the institutional space. Since institutional 
space is socially and temporally constructed through recursive relationship 
between practices and institutional order (Pan 2000), the strategy to decouple 
structure and activities enables actors to broaden institutional space and 
therefore increases the overall flexibility and competitiveness of the media 
organization. 
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In our case, the organizational structure does not evolve at the same speed as 
the institutional environment in the partial reform context, and there emerged 
the problem of "incompatibility" between a traditional organization form and 
its evolutionary institutional environment. The coexistence of "old" and "new" 
institutional logics is characterized by the duality of institutional demands to 
satisfy both the government's propaganda needs and financial interests. The 
coexistence of different institutional logics signifies the duality of governing 
values and rules. Under such circumstances, decoupling between 
organizational structure and activities enables individual actors to decouple the 
different institutional logics in their daily practices, thus softening the tension 
between different governing rules and values. It is an important strategic 
approach in broadening the institutional space and spanning boundaries of 
different institutional demands, and thus increasing the competitiveness and 
flexibility of the party organ organization and its adaptability in the transitional 
environment. 
Decoupling of organizational structure and daily activities can be measured by 
the extent to which individual actors attempt to actively attach their activities to 
the "new" market values and detach their activities from the traditional 
propaganda values, so that they are able to use market values as governing 
rules or the institutional logic to guide their daily activities. To illustrate this, 
we should understand that value systems governing daily activities are 
produced and represented by many elements of the context, such as the 
physical space, routine practice, and identities. 
With the cases from my field study, I have identified three behavioral patterns 
of structural adaptation which I summarize as "spanning of space", "spanning 
of practice" and "spanning of identity". The cases used to illustrate these 
patterns demonstrate how individual actors maximize the power of market 
values as the governing rules in their daily activities through strategically 
spanning structural boundaries in the transitional organization. 
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4.2 Spanning of Space 
There have been many studies in the sociology field on how the regionalization 
of space is used to establish social institutions and orders. According to A. 
Giddens (1984), knowledgeable social actors perform their strategic conducts 
in a certain "locale" where they interact with the context and deal with 
resources as well as constraints. Giddens also explained how public and 
private social behaviors are enabled under different social contexts through 
"regionalization" of space. The setting within which an actor performs his or 
her conduct constrains as well enables the actions. Similarly, Foucault (1977) 
explained in his studies how power and disciplines are established with certain 
structures of time and space. These studies on contextuality and the interaction 
between actors and the context are very important to our understanding of how 
the spanning of space is realized and used to broaden institutional space. We 
believe that a social setting constrains and also enables certain behaviors, and 
that settings articulated with different institutional logics would induce 
different organizational behaviors. In this case, we will look at the relocation 
and reorganization of office space and analyze how the interplay of individual 
actions and social setting could decouple organizational structure and activities 
and contribute to the spanning of institutional space. 
Spanning of space in this case refers to behaviors to organize physical space in 
creating a setting which facilitates one set of institutional logics rather than the 
other as the governing rules of daily activities. Spanning of space is especially 
effective when the organization form does not conform to institutional demands, 
particularly in a transition context. In our case, the reorganization of office 
space in the advertising department is an example of how spatial spanning 
represented by creating a market oriented working environment out of the 
traditional party organ environment has enabled individuals to attach market 
values and detach from propaganda values in their daily activities. 
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Since TV stations in China symbolize and represent government authority, 
security considerations are regarded as a high priority. The physical structure 
of ZJTV's office building represents such values in a traditional government 
organ. ZJTV's headquarter office is protected by high walls, security checks at 
the main entrance and mandatory registration requirements by visitors. People 
walk around the offices with their permits and badges. These are several signs 
of the authoritarian value which one would hardly fai] to notice when entering 
ZJTV's office building. The security measures signify and send a strong 
message that a Chinese TV station is not a friendly place to the general public. 
As a propaganda tool, a TV station is regarded as a politically sensitive 
organization and obviously has information which can not be disclosed to the 
general public without government sanction. In ZJTV's written working 
guidebooks, there are detailed regulations on how program tapes should be 
handled, and in particular, how tapes of political information and reference 
programs should be carefully handled. Complicated approval procedures are 
required for borrowing and copying the "reference programs" which normally 
refer to politically sensitive programs. 
These regulations and office security arrangements may very well conform to 
the propaganda requirements, yet they are in conflict with the advertising 
department's urgent need to establish a business image under the newly 
imposed financial requirements. Under the pressure to act in a more business-
like manner, the advertising department decided to move their office away 
from ELC's main office and relocate themselves to a commercial building. The 
move was believed to be helpful in soliciting more advertising revenue. Ms. 
Wang, head of the advertising department, said to me that the advertising 
department decided that they had to create an atmosphere where any potential 
customer would feel free to come and "talk business". 
During my field trip in ELC, I often heard people complain that doing 
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advertising was getting increasingly difficult these years. From the early days 
of media reform until present, China' advertising market has evolved very 
much from a seller's market to a buyer's market. One of the main reasons is 
the increase in the number of media outlets and the fact that advertisers have 
become more mature in selecting their ideal media outlets. In Hangzhou City 
area alone, there are more than thirty channels, including nine channels from 
CCTV，seven channels from ZJTV, several city level channels and other 
satellite channels. CCTV has a state sanctioned monopoly with which a 
provincial TV station cannot compete, and city level TV stations operate under 
a more flexible organizational structure that benefit from the distance with the 
central power. For example, a city level TV station is not restricted by the 
regulation that TV dramas from Hong Kong and Taiwan cannot be aired during 
the prime time slot from 19:30 to 21:30. In city level stations, less concern is 
given to the "political correctness" of program contents as well. Competition 
in the advertising market is fierce. Just as ELC's channel director said: "We 
have to move fast and fight hard." In order to fulfill their financial contract, 
ELC's advertising department cannot afford to lose any potential advertisers. 
Relocation of their office was one of the first moves the advertising department 
made in their efforts to establish a business image. 
The relocation of the advertising department from TV station's main office 
building to a separate commercial office tower was one of the first things that I 
noticed when I came to ELC. ZJTV's main office building is situated right at 
the center of downtown area, just one block away from the Hangzhou 
municipal government office building. Like other government unit offices, 
entry registration is required for all visitors to ZJTV. An official introduction 
letter from the visitor' work unit used to be required to enter ZJTV's office area, 
but this procedure has become more and more relaxed in the recent years. 
Even though the entrance registration procedure may very well be justified by 
security reasons, it is not a welcoming gesture for advertisers or potential 
customers who want to come to talk business. "Registration at the entrance 
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does not help the business atmosphere or our business image." Ms. Wang told 
me. Today, the advertising department is situated on the 26th floor of a very 
modem commercial building, surrounded by domestic and international 
companies. 
Although the relocation may have caused a little inconvenience in 
communication with channel's other offices, it has given the advertising 
department more flexibility in daily operations in addition to setting up a 
business image. The commercial office atmosphere is said to have not only 
triggered more business, but also given the advertising department more 
freedom in do things in a more flexible way, since they are no longer "directly 
under the eyes of the station leaders" as one person in the advertising 
department put it. People in the advertising department have more flexible 
working hours than those working in the station's main offices, which has 
allowed for business development activities outside the office. The commercial 
office building setting also helps create a more relaxed atmosphere for friendly 
chats, business negotiations and even some "under the table" deals. 
Compared with ELC's main offices, the advertising department's office has a 
reception, a waiting area with comfortable sofas and a meeting area with coffee 
tables. More importantly, in the advertising department's office, visitors are 
welcomed instead of being asked to register or present an introduction letter. 
The settings in the new office reflect the basic values of a market based agent-
customer relationship. It's reasonable to argue that with the physical presence 
of a traditional party organ setting, it would be much more difficult for such 
values to be reflected. 
Not only is the whole adverting department separated from ELC's main office 
building, but within the advertising department's offices, general staff and the 
department head are also situated on different floors. I was told that this has 
been a "deliberate arrangement". "In this way, the department head can have 
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more 'privacy' when talking with customers." Mr. Wang in the advertising 
department told me secretively. The spatial distances between the advertising 
department's office and its headquarter and between the advertising 
department's general office and the head office, on one hand give individuals in 
the advertising department more freedom from the bureaucratic control, and on 
the other hand allow for certain non-transparent practices to happen in daily 
operations including some "secret deals". 
Spanning of space in creating a market oriented setting out of the "official，， 
party organ setting is realized in our case through the relocation of office and 
other physical arrangements within the working area. Such strategic approach 
gradually decouples the organizational structure and the daily activities by 
enabling individuals in the advertising department to attach market values 
instead of propaganda values to their market based and customer oriented 
activities. Spanning of space through specific spatial organization is effective 
in creating a context where market based values can be the governing rules for 
daily activities, even though the media organization on a whole is still largely 
guided by the propaganda rules. 
Spanning of space to shift the governing values and rules from the propaganda 
requirements in the big environment to the market based values in a more 
micro environment would not have been possible had it not been for the 
coexistence of both propaganda and market oriented institutional demands. 
The fact that what used to be the ideological explanation for a media 
organization has now become an ideological explanation has given both 
individuals and the organization more institutional space by strategically 
selecting one set of logics against the other to justify the way in which the 
organization or at least a part of the organization is structured and arranged. 
However, we need to note that the effectiveness of space spanning is largely 
limited to the extent that the old institutional logics are still dominant and play 
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a major role in shaping the organizational structure. In our case, since the 
authoritarian power in the media organization is still largely represented by the 
propaganda requirements, it is hard for us to image, for example, that the 
editorial unit could enjoy the same freedom as the advertising department in 
selecting a market oriented spatial arrangement. 
4.3 Spanning of Practice 
Spanning of practices, especially routine practices, is another strategic 
behavioral approach which helps to decouple the organizational structure and 
activities. Spanning of practice refers to the strategic behaviors in the 
transitional context to actively reconstruct and reproduce the meaning and 
content of routine activities structured under the old institutional logics and 
adapt them to the new institutional demands. Through spanning of practice, 
actors are able to separate the content from the practice's original form, thus 
loosening the necessary connection between the organizational structure and 
activities. Consequently, reproducing and reconstructing meaning of routine 
practices in the transition era enables people in the advertising department to 
push for more institutional space and span the boundaries of institutional 
constraints. 
Political study (“zheng zhi xue xi”) is a traditional organizational routine 
practice in China's government organs with the purpose to reinforce the party's 
ideological control. It has also been the traditional channel of internal 
communication in party organs. Political study sessions usually take the form 
of regular internal meetings where the latest party policies and "spirits" are 
transmitted from party secretaries to all organizational members. In the reform 
era, this tradition of political education is still valued as the most important 
internal communication channel in most government organs. However, the 
contents of the political education are going through some changes. 
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ZJTV, being the party's propaganda tool, has naturally kept this routine practice 
as a valued tradition, and political study sessions are still important routine 
practice in all departments of the media organization. On my first day to work, 
I was "lucky" enough to be asked to attend the advertising department's weekly 
political study session which turned out to be quite different than I expected. 
The political study session was hosted by Ms. Wang, head of the department. 
Instead of political education, the meeting turned out to be an educational 
lesson on how to play the "edge balls" in advertising practices. The study 
began with Ms. Wang urging everyone in the department to work harder and 
get more ads, because they were still "10 million away from the revenue quota 
this year". If they don't fulfill the quota, there won't be any annual bonuses for 
them. I was told later that the annual bonus actually constitute 80% of the total 
income for staff in the advertising department. Ms. Wang said they had to be 
more ‘‘aggressive，，. "I fully understand that maintaining a good relationship 
with clients is important and it's perfectly understandable to accept gifts or 
exchange gifts with clients. But it has to be done within certain limits and you 
have to be smart enough not to tell everything to the outside if you know that 
any kind of investigation is going on." Ms. Wang then said: "If there is any 
need for me or other channel leaders to have business dinners with clients, you 
have to let me know. If necessary, we can even do some favorable news for 
them. Everything can be negotiated. The bottom line is: you have to get more 
clients in." Ms. Wang then praised one person in the department who 
"arranged" two dinners in one day for her to meet with some potential clients. 
"But you have to be careful." She went on to tell that there had been some 
internal investigations going on with Qianjiang Channel, another specialized 
channel in ZJTV, since someone in Qianjiang Channel accepted money from an 
advertiser and cut the advertiser a "special" deal. "There are many ways to be 
aggressive. You need to think and be flexible." was Ms. Wang's concluding 
comment in the political study. Apparently, what used to be political education 
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has now evolved into education on how to fulfill the financial tasks in the 
reform age. Later on, I participated in other political study sessions where Ms. 
Wang briefed her staff on the latest "political weather", such as reminding them 
to be extra careful with media contents when it was close to August the 
Communist Party's birthday, when TV programs would be censored more 
strictly and political mistakes would be more deadly. 
Just as traditional political studies serve as an important means for ideological 
reinforcement, the "evolved" political study sessions also provide guidance in 
the ambiguous institutional environment on how to keep the balance between 
the "bottom line" and the "party line". Spanning of space is done by utilizing 
patterns of practice from existing organizational structure, attaching market 
values to these practices and adapting them to serve the new market needs in 
the transitional context. 
Despite the cultural root of this strategic approach that Chinese people have 
been historically skillful in separating "forms" from "contents" in order to 
survive the usually ambiguous governing premises, this approach to challenge 
the official interpretation of a practice is to be handled with special care. As I 
noticed during my field trip, such political study session which had "new 
contents" always happened in internal and relatively private settings. Even 
though mostly of what Ms. Wang talked about during the political study 
sessions was no news to people in the advertising department, such speeches 
were only given behind doors and were not to be publicly released. Once 
during my interview with the channel director, I tried to verify a case where 
ELC did some favorable news for an advertiser. The case was set out by Ms. 
Wang as an example of operational "flexibility" in one of the sessions. Not 
surprisingly, the channel director denied that there was any paid journalism in 
ZJTV, emphasizing that they were very serious about news production and had 
never sold any news for advertising revenues. 
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It is not difficult to see from our case that the separation of "form" and content" 
in the spanning of practice is largely limited to practices performed in an 
informal and unofficial manner rather than those conducted in official and open 
organizational settings. Under the circumstances where market pressure has to 
be dealt with insufficient resources, spanning of practice is a temporary 
solution to maximize resources and provide guidance in an ambiguous and 
uncertain institutional environment. 
4.4 Spanning of Identity 
The confusions and ambiguities in the institutional environment are also 
reflected in the process of continuous construction and reconstruction of 
identities by social actors. As the media organization changes from a pure 
government organ to a more market oriented model, actors move from a well-
established and familiar institutional context to a less familiar and therefore 
uncertain context. Therefore, we would expect to see actors' efforts to actively 
interpret and search for new identities in the changing environment. 
Spanning of identity refers to the strategic behaviors to increase the mobility of 
identity through linking and reconstructing identities established under 
different value systems in order to fit into the relatively unstable social and 
organizational contexts in a transition institutional environment. In our case, 
as ZJTV transforms from a pure socialist party organ to a partially 
commercialized "enterprise", we see interesting mixture in the use of 
"socialist" and "capitalist" administrative and professional titles. Since job 
titles basically describe job tasks and identify what a person does in an 
organization, we believe that people in the advertising department feel the need 
to actively search for their own identities as the organization's identity becomes 
ambiguous. 
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In China's traditional government organs, people are given titles according to 
their administrative ranks in the Communist Party's hierarchical system. A 
station director is called "Tai Zhang" which means "head of station". All of the 
department heads are called "Zhu Ren" which means "person in charge". 
Names and titles like "managers" and "directors" are the newly imported terms 
from the west capitalist world and have been adopted mostly by enterprises 
rather than government organizations. Today, as ZJTV tries to introduce 
market values and market based logics into its operation, we observe attempts 
and eagerness by people in the media organization to use market oriented terms 
and titles, which consequently leads to a mixture of professional identities. 
In ELC, the head of the channel is called the "Channel Director" {''pin dao 
zong jiarC'), a name seldom used by government organizations. Ms. Wang, 
head of the advertising department, is internally called "Zhu Ren", the 
traditional title for mid-level section leaders in a government unit. But when 
Ms. Wang is introduced to clients, she is called by her fellow colleagues "our 
manager" which is also the title on her business card. Mr. Wang, Ms. Wang's 
assistant, is a former TV program director in his fifties. Mr. Wang directed an 
award wining TV documentary called "Stepping out of the Matriarchy 
Kingdom". Since there was not enough funding for documentary productions, 
Mr. Wang was transferred to the advertising department. Giving his expertise 
in TV production, he was appointed one of the three members in the channel's 
Program Purchasing Committee. Everyone in the adverting department called 
him "Wang Lao Shi" (which means “Teacher Wang'), a traditional and 
respectful way of addressing people who are senior and experienced in the 
government's art work units {''wen yi dan wef，)，like media outlets. But when 
"Teacher Wang" is introduced to advertisers, he becomes "Manager Wang", a 
much more market oriented title. The rest of the team in the advertising 
department are called "sales executive" Cye wu yuari"), a business title 
perfectly fit for communicating with customers but seldom seen in government 
organs. It seems that borrowing such terms from the economic sector is not 
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only fashionable but also effective in the advertising department's effort to set 
up a market oriented image. The flexibility in selecting suitable professional 
titles under different contexts is further enhanced by not printing a specific title 
on most people's business cards in the advertising department, so that they can 
strategically position themselves either as sales persons in the business sector 
or cadres working in a party organ. 
The mixture in using "socialist" and "capitalist" job titles signified individual 
actors' experimental efforts in trying to fit into an ambiguous institutional 
context with different environmental demands. Spanning of identity through 
continuously linking and reconstructing their job tasks either as "business 
workers" or "government workers" increases the mobility of individual identity 
in the transitional organization. The strategic choices of job titles and the 
associated job descriptions also reflect actors' proactive approach to articulate 
oneself with a certain value system that would be more efficient and effective 
and the other in satisfying particular institutional demands. Like the spanning 
of space and practice, spanning of identity decouples daily activities from a 
well-established and constraining party organ structure, which consequently 
increases organizational flexibility. 
4.5. Discussion 
I illustrated above how individual actors are able to strategically decouple their 
daily activities from the party organ structure through the spanning of space, 
practices and identities. The three behavioral patterns identified are strategic 
approaches of structural adaptation where actors proactively create a sub-
context in the party organ institutional context. The sub-context is created 
through reorganizing physical space, modifying routine practices and 
reinterpreting job tasks. Such sub-context facilitates market oriented behaviors 
in the transitional organization by providing a setting where the new market 
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values can be easily interpreted as the governing institutional logic. 
We can also view such sub-context as institutional space which functions as a 
buffering area for social actors when they are trying to deal with both 
propaganda needs and market needs. The approaches to span space, practice 
and identity are strategic attempts of structural adaptation to decouple a well 
established party organ structure and daily activities in order to satisfy dual 
institutional demands, especially the newly introduced financial demands. 
These patterns of strategic behavior broaden the boundaries of the organization 
structure so that social actors do not necessarily have to follow the party organ 
logic in the party organ structure in their daily activities, thereby improving the 
flexibility and adaptability of the organization in the transitional environment. 
I have illustrated the three behavioral patterns of structural adaptation with 
cases from ZJTV's advertising department. My study shows that the proactive 
selection of the strategic behaviors is based on actors' knowledge on a 
particular situation and assessment of the "dangerousness" of their attempts. 
For example, I often heard people in the advertising department legitimize their 
behaviors with some explanations of the ambiguous context. Apparently, 
people are aware that interpretative accounts are necessary to legitimate such 
strategic approaches and can reduce the danger of "out of frame" behaviors. 
Furthermore, such strategic behaviors always happen in a temporary, informal 
and opportunistic manner and are highly limited to daily activities related to 
advertising. Spanning of space broadens the boundaries of the party organ 
structure by providing a market oriented physical presence in the working 
environment, but is limited to advertising related activities in the media 
organization. Spanning of practice maximizes limited resources, but in a very 
informal manner. Spanning of identity attaches market value to people's job 
tasks, but also as opportunistic approaches. 
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As we have already discussed, the advertising department is faced with the 
problem of having to deal with market needs and facilitate market oriented 
activities in a highly authoritarian and hierarchical bureaucracy. As the 
frontline workers to fulfill economic tasks, actors in the advertising department 
opt to maximize their resources to attach market values in daily activities in the 
party organ. In the context with dual institutional logics, strategically 
decoupling the different values of organization structure and activities is 
apparently the most effective approach in structural adaptation to make market 
logic the governing rules while avoiding violating the propaganda rules. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SYMBOLIC ADAPTATION - BUILDING A SYMBOLIC BRIDGE 
5.1 Symbolic Adaptation in a Transitional Context 
Besides structural adaptation, symbolic adaptation is an equally important 
aspect of strategic adaptation in dealing with various tensions and conflicts in a 
transitional context. To put it simple, symbolic adaptation refers to strategic 
behaviors in articulating or bridging the old and new value systems in the 
transition symbolic environment. 
Organizational strategies are highly context oriented and are adapted to specific 
institutional settings. Therefore, it is important to study on the micro level how 
"a symbolic bridge" (Gioia et al 1994) is established between the familiar and 
the strange in the transitional context. Such symbolic bridges are established 
through the search for commonness by drawing on norms, behaviors and 
symbols from the old institutions and adapting them into the new context for 
the purpose of forming appropriate interpretative discourses. 
In Giddens' structuration model (1984), institutional structures are seen as both 
products and contexts. Cultural rules are changed by ongoing activities but at 
the same time act as constraints and guides to future activities. Therefore, it is 
important to understand the process of dialogue and interdependency of 
ongoing activities and interpretation of actions. In a transitional context, since 
the ideological framework is ambiguous and the institutional logics are in 
question, symbolic adaptation is an important strategic approach in the 
articulation of diverse meaning systems to justify and legitimize certain 
ongoing activities. Such legitimacy takes form in the mechanism that justifies 
a particular social arrangement or social activities through establishing 
legitimizing discourses and recursive experiments. 
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Symbolic adaptation mainly takes the form of "symbolic bridging" which is the 
strategic approach to gap different institutional logics in a transitional context. 
The symbolic bridge is built through the search for commonness in different 
value systems or governing rules in order to establish justifying discourses for 
certain activities. In our case, the two different sets of institutional logics are 
the party propaganda logic and the market logic. The ambiguities in the 
ideological environment for media organizations in the reform era have 
enabled individual actors to articulate both market and propaganda values in 
explaining and justifying certain activities. 
In illustrating how individual actors skillfully articulate one set of rules or the 
other in forming interpretative discourses to justify daily activities, I have 
identified three behavioral patterns of symbolic adaptation in my field study. I 
summarize them as "boundary blurring", "symbolic packaging" and 
"ideological framing". In our case, boundary blurring is used to justify certain 
grey area activities. Symbolic packaging is used when actors in the advertising 
department attempt to attach either market or propaganda demands to particular 
activities. Lastly, ideological framing is used mainly to legitimize market 
oriented programming policies such as the audience appeal. 
5.2 Boundary Blurring 
Using slogan expressions to symbolize routine practices is a traditional practice 
in China's organizations. During my field trip, I heard many expressions which 
symbolize and justify organizational behaviors under different institutional 
logics. I often heard people use the "white cat and black cat" statement, Deng 
Xiaoping's famous theory, to justify their activities in situations where certain 
amount of flexibility ("ling huo chu li") is needed. One of the most commonly 
used expressions was "to play edge ball"�“da ca bian qiu”�which refers to risk 
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taking behaviors in grey areas. The expression can be applied in numerous 
contexts and used to justify activities which might cause either legal, regulatory 
or political risks. 
By "playing edge ball", actors strategically blur the institutional boundaries in 
their organizational behaviors and test the limits of what can be done and what 
can not be done in the transitional media organization. Boundary blurring is a 
proactive approach to strategically blur the formal and informal boundaries 
which define various institutional demands by carefully interpreting the 
symbolic meaning of these institutional demands. Playing edge ball is based 
on such symbolic boundary blurring and careful estimates of both risks and 
benefits of out of frame behaviors. 
I observe quite a number of cases of edge ball playing in my field study. In one 
case, a middleman representing an advertiser came to the advertising 
department to negotiate placing an ad. The middleman said that he would not 
negotiate the price if he could get an invoice for the fiill amount while the 
actual payment was only 80%. Ms. He told me that such requests are not 
uncommon and they usually solve such problems by making some special 
adjustments in accounting which she referred to as "zou zhang" (meaning 
"processing the accounts") and playing a little bit of edge ball. 
Other cases of "edge ball playing" are largely related to programming, 
especially when regulations on program scheduling are concerned. ELC once 
bought a Hong Kong TV serial starring Law Ka Leung, a popular Hong Kong 
actor, and the channel believed the program would be a big hit. There is an 
internal regulation that Hong Kong and Taiwan TV dramas can only be 
scheduled during the day time or after 21:30 in the evening. In order not to 
lose audience to other channels which start playing their popular Hong Kong or 
Taiwan serials at 21:30, ELC scheduled their serial at 21:15, just fifteen 
minutes before the other channels. "There is only a fifteen minutes difference. 
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The station leaders won't care or say much." Ms. Wang told me, "This is called 
edge ball playing." In fact, edge ball playing can be applied to many similar 
cases. 
In order to achieve the revenue target with limited resources, actors in the 
advertising department have developed skills to lower risks by finding strategic 
partners and establishing justification statements for the grey area activities. 
The justifications of such grey area activities are made through blurring 
institutional boundaries and are facilitated by existence of an ambiguous and 
nontransparent institutional environment. 
In ELC, almost all business decisions are backed up by precedents or the fact 
that "someone else is doing it." An important philosophy for grey area 
activities is that "if everyone does it, it's safe." The mixture of different types 
of programs in so-called specialized channels is such an example. Since no 
channel is capable of fulfilling the financial contract by strictly following the 
“prescribed，，niche marketing strategy, no channel follows it at all, and every 
channel plays TV dramas even though they are criticized for not being 
professional. 
In fact, the institutional boundaries in the transitional media organization are so 
unclear that it has almost become a common practice for actors not to follow 
the rules in their daily activities. ZJTV internally regulates that advertising 
time cannot exceed 12% of the total broadcasting time during prime time slots 
which comes to about 40 minutes and 15% of the total broadcasting time on an 
average daily basis. When I was working in ZJTV, I was asked to do a 
summary report to compare the advertising time in evening programs by each 
channel. My statistics show that no channel follows the internal guideline on 
ad time and that all channels have excess ad time. For example, ELC has about 
60 minutes of ads during its prime time slot in evening programs and Qianjiang 
Channel has as much as 100 minutes of advertising in its evening programs. 
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Complaints from the audience on the excess amount of advertising are not 
uncommon. However, Ms. Wang in charge of the advertising department also 
has her complaints: "I don't have other choices. If other channels can have 
more advertising time, why can't we. How would you expect me to achieve 
the revenue target with that limited advertising time?" 
In this case, the effort to blur regulatory boundaries is reflected in the attempt 
to justify out-of-frame practices by finding risk sharing "partners". Even 
though a buffer area may not exist in the regulations themselves, it can be 
created by weakening the linkage between activities and governing rules to 
lower the risks of out-of-frame practices. 
Actors in the media outlet constantly push the institutional boundaries for more 
institutional space. It is important to note that the existence of the buffer areas, 
be it legal or regulatory, provides room for individual discretion in coping with 
external environmental pressure. Ambiguities in the governing rules and 
social actors' proactive attempts to blur the boundaries of these rules facilitate 
grey area behaviors. 
Uncertainties and ambiguities in the institutional environment come from the 
ambiguities in the dominant ideology and the institutional logic to which 
organizational structure respond. In fact, as we observe from our cases, 
blurring institutional boundaries is facilitated, to a large extent, by the 
ambiguities in rules in the transition era. Therefore, we can reasonably argue 
that as the institutional environment gets more stabilized and the rules become 
clearer, boundary blurring will become more and more difficult. We also need 
to note that social actors' ability to blur institutional boundaries is largely 
subject to the authority' will to allow such behaviors to happen. 
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5.3 Symbolic Packaging 
Symbolic packaging refers to the strategic approach to justify or legitimize 
certain activities or practices by attaching the dominant symbolic rules to these 
activities or practices so that they become ideologically fit in the dominant 
symbolic framework. 
In our case, symbolic packaging is mostly used to justify the existence of 
infomercials which is a direct outcome of the media reform. In ZJTV, there are 
three so-called "categories of advertisements". The first category of ads refers 
to traditional commercials. The second category is called "information ads" 
which refers to programs like "Business Fax", a ten minute long program 
which contains all kinds of "business information". The third category is 
called “lecture programs" which refers to promotional programs wrapped as 
educational programs, mostly on medical services. These lecture programs are 
normally scheduled after 12:00 pm and in most cases are subcontracted to an 
outside buyer. Traditional commercials are also referred to as "hard ads", while 
the second and third category of advertisements are usually referred to as "soft 
ads". Hard ads and soft ads are different in their pricings as well as content 
monitoring. For the first category ads, advertisers usually get a 30% to 40% 
discount depending on payment terms, which comes to around RMB5,000 per 
thirty seconds for prime time slots. A second category ad would cost only half 
of the price of a first category ad. As for third category ads, pricing is very 
arbitrary. During my field trip, an individual who had some background 
connections with one of the station leaders signed a contract with ELC to 
subcontract a twenty minute long "lecture program" for six months at the price 
of RMB220,000. Advertising rates for hard ads are more or less fixed and 
everyone in the advertising department has the right to give an advertiser a 
30% to 40% discount off the published rate. Higher discounts would have to 
be approved by Ms. Wang, head of the department. For soft ads, the rate is less 
fixed and usually decided by the department head on a case by case basis. 
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The hard and soft ads are categorized in a very informal manner and mostly 
used as internal guidelines for different advertising charges. During my field 
trip, I have never seen any official documents in ZJTV which describe how ads 
are categorized into such three types. Seriously speaking, only the first 
category is the legitimate category of ads according to advertising law and both 
the second and third categories of ads exist at the boundary of what is 
legitimate advertising. It is largely due to the ambiguities in the advertising 
laws and regulations in China that such information and lecture programs can 
be wrapped up as public service programs and charged at an advertising rate. 
However, for ELC, the existence of soft ads not only helps to generate more 
income, but also gives the channel more flexibility in fulfilling the financial 
responsible contract. Even though information and lecture programs generate 
advertising revenue, these revenues are not officially calculated into the total 
advertising revenue, therefore it's difficult for outside market research 
companies to know what the real advertising revenue is. Because the channel 
has a lot more flexibility in both program length and pricing for information 
and lecture programs than it has for commercials, there is more room in their 
negotiations with advertisers and therefore the channel is able to maximize its 
limited resources. Since soft ads exist at the boundary of legitimate and 
illegitimate advertisings, the monitoring of such programs is more relaxed and 
flexible. For example, the ten minute long "Business Fax" program is a pure 
TV direct selling program of beauty and health products which has a 
demonstrator and some "story tellers". Mr. Ge in the advertising department 
told me that "seriously speaking, a lot of these information programs are 
deceptive ads, but those who got caught are the unlucky ones. I don't think the 
SAIC cares too much. There are too many programs like these." On the 
marketing brochure for "Business Fax", it says that "Business Fax" is a 
program which "reflects economic trends, discovers hot topics in the economic 
world, provides a platform for enterprises to demonstrate their images and 
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cultures and provides advice to consumers." 
The existence of such information programs is well justified by the Party's 
rhetoric that media is a public service provider and that advertising is an 
accelerator and catalyst in China's economic development. It is the central 
government's emphasis on the public service function of the media in the 
economic reform era that facilitates symbolic packaging behaviors for certain 
media contents and helps justify the existence of infomercials. 
However, symbolic packaging is not an easy game, and playing around the 
symbolic framework requires strong awareness of the political role which 
China's media plays. In the government's official accounts, advertising should 
also introduce appropriate political ideology in addition to introducing 
commodities to consumers. Although information and lecture programs have 
pretty much autonomy on what kind of business information they can release, 
there could be serious problems if the political aspect of the game is neglected. 
When I was in ELC, I witnessed a case where an infomercial caused a severe 
political mistake which explains the limits of symbolic packaging. One 
morning in July 2002, Ms. Wang called for an urgent meeting within the 
advertising department and she sounded seriously worried. On ELC's 
"Business Fax" program, there was a piece of promotional ad for a government 
organization in Zhejiang's Taizhou city. The ad described that the government 
organization was looking for a business partner and was willing to invite any 
outside parties to cooperate with it. The ad itself was fine. The problem was 
that the spokesman for the organization was someone who pretended to be the 
vice mayor of Taizhou City. The fake vice mayor was immediately spotted by 
a Representative of the People's Congress (yen da dai biad") who was 
attending the Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress meeting at that time. The 
Representative immediately called up the leader at ZJTV and asked why that 
fake mayor could appear on TV. Realizing that this could be a serious political 
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mistake, ZJTV's leaders immediately called directors of all channels and 
advertising department heads for an emergency meeting, requesting a thorough 
investigation on the production of the ad. Both ELC's director and Ms. Wang 
was "seriously criticized" for not keeping the propaganda standard in their 
work. "In our work to promote economy development, we should never loosen 
our work as party's propaganda tool, and we can never deliver a wrong 
propaganda message to the people" Ms. Wang relayed this message to 
everyone in the advertising department and asked all staff to be extremely 
careful with ads which have any appearance of government organizations or 
official figures. Ms. Wang also mentioned that she remembered some time ago, 
there was one ad promoting a restaurant near the Provincial People's Court, 
and some persons working in the court were interviewed for the restaurant. Ms. 
Wang then said that she was "terrified" now to recall that ad because "no 
government organizations are allowed to appear on any TV program unless 
there is an official approval.” Ms. Wang then asked everyone in the advertising 
department to study the "Propaganda Work Guidebook" very carefully and 
demanded that no such cases ever happen again, because a serious political 
mistake like this could mean the “end of career". Not surprisingly, the ad with 
the fake major was immediately pulled out. 
What we observe from this case is that symbolic packaging is strictly limited to 
the economic part of the symbolic environment. This is to say that although 
media's public service function is sanctioned, and sometimes even celebrated 
in the reform era, such public service function is strictly limited to the 
economic aspect but not the political aspect of social life. 
5.4 Ideological Framing 
Actors in an organization attach meanings to the events they experience by 
reference to their existing experience. Giddens (1984) thinks that all activities 
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are linked through an "interpretive scheme" to a meaning system. Some studies 
on transitional societies (Whitley and Czaban 1998) show that the ensuing 
uncertainties in the context where conflicting institutional logics coexist will 
exert a "pull forward conformity" with part norms, values and practices. 
Ideological framing here refers to the strategic behaviors to select, link and 
articulate different ideological statements in forming an interpretative scheme 
to frame and justify "out of frame" activities or practices. Ideological framing 
is used in our case to legitimize certain market oriented programming policies, 
the audience appeal principle in particular. 
Getting audience oriented programs is a continuous fight for ELC, especially 
for the advertising department who has to sell programs to advertisers. With 
the increasing financial pressure, the advertising department is gradually 
gaining more bargaining power in programming, which can be reflected in its 
active role in the channel's program selection and purchasing process. The 
Propaganda Work Guidebook regulates that TV programs should be evaluated 
for their "moral" standards, as well as their "artistic" and "entertaining" 
standards. Since the evaluation of a program's moral standard does not have 
hard rules, the process is quite subjective and even somewhat arbitrary. 
Therefore, how a program is presented for its moral standard becomes a crucial 
part in getting the green light. Although ELC produces its own programs like 
the "Economic News" (“jing shi xin wen''\ the "Bull and Bear Market Battle" 
(“niu xiong da bi pin'') and "Give Your Justice" Cgei ni shuo fcT�’ prime time 
programs have always been TV dramas which they need to purchase from 
outside. Therefore，the channel's choices on TV dramas are important deciding 
factors in TV rating. 
Mr. Wang who is one of the three members in ELC's Program Purchase Group 
told me that although it maybe easy to identify which TV drama is going to hit, 
it is difficult and sometimes tricky to present the program to the station leaders. 
"There are normally two deciding factors in a TV serial. First, it has to have 
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some love story element. Second, it better has some element of suspense like a 
detective story. After all, you can always refer to the previous rating by other 
TV stations." Higher rating means higher purchase price. The main problem 
Mr. Wang faces is that he does not have a handsome budget to buy TV dramas 
with good rating records, therefore, he has to constantly make choices among 
the second tier TV serials. Mr. Wang told me that "it's all about good 
interpretation and timing to get the green light for a TV serial. For example, 
you should always schedule a modem age TV drama during times like the 
National Day, and it better be on revolutionary topics." 
Under such circumstances, ideological framing is a strategic approach to 
skillfully link the market rule of audience appeal with the propaganda rule of 
the education function of the media by articulating the logic of "serving the 
people" with the logic of "attracting audiences". In the cases from my field 
study, ideological framing is used to strategically interpret and frame the 
market principles so that they fit into the dominant ideological framework of a 
propaganda tool like ZJTV. 
The Program Purchase Group (the Group) once selected a TV drama entitled 
“1/2 Murder" which is a traditional detective story with no big stars, but it has 
some suspense and even violence. The Group thought "1/2 Murder" would 
attract young audiences. In order to get the budget approved for this TV serial, 
the Group had to write a summary of the story's plotline and an evaluation 
report on its moral and artistic standards. Since the station leaders would not 
have time to sit down and watch the entire TV serial, presentation skills were 
important in getting the green light. 
In the summary of "1/2 Murder", emphasis was laid on both the political 
significance of the topic and the artistic standard of production. It was stated in 
the summary that "this TV drama praised our policemen's courage and wisdom 
in protecting people's lives in the new reform era. The TV serial has 
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demonstrated a glorious image of contemporary policemen who are not only 
equipped with scientific knowledge of detective work, but also with political 
thoughts and awareness." Even though this may sound highly superficial and 
political, Mr. Wang told me that such statements summarizing the "moral 
standard" were essential in getting the approval for the program, because 
"political correctness of a TV drama is still a crucial criterion to station 
leaders." Another TV drama purchased by ELC which turned out to be a good 
choice was a serial called "Modem Family" ("Mo Deng Jia Ting”�. "Modem 
Family" is about cross border marriages, a hit topic in recent years. The serial 
is a comedy about an old Beijing couple whose children are married to foreign 
people and it talks about how cultural clashes give rise to comic situations. 
This TV serial was packaged in its evaluation report as a realistic drama which 
"reveals the improvement of people's living standards in the reform era and 
promotes friendship between international people." 
Another interesting example is the argument on whether ELC should air a 
Taiwan program called "Sex Score". "Sex Score" is a popular and outspoken 
Taiwan educational program which discusses issues related to young people's 
sex lives. The program takes the form of participant discussions and touches 
many sensitive areas in the Chinese culture. When Mr. Wang saw a demon tape 
of "Sex Score" in another station, he tried to persuade ELC's leaders to buy the 
program, knowing that it would be a big hit. The reason was simple: "sex 
always sells". However, fearing that the topic might be too sensitive, the 
leaders decided that it was safer to follow the "socialist moral standards" 
carefully despite the program's possible market impact and did not stand on Mr. 
Wang's side. Coincidently, there was some local news about a sixteen year old 
girl who got sexually abused due to the lack of sex knowledge. An official 
from the provincial propaganda office then expressed his view that mass media 
should also propagate the necessary educational knowledge related to sex. 
Sensing that it was the right political atmosphere for "Sex Score", the 
advertising department urged ELC's leaders to purchase the program by 
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articulating its significance and political correctness in the educational function. 
By the time I left ELC, I heard that ELC has agreed in principle to purchase the 
program. 
We observe from our case that actors are able to skillfully draw values and 
practices from seemingly conflicting meaning systems to form the interpretive 
scheme in justifying activities. Audience appeal, including violence and sex 
appeals, is framed in ideological discourses like "enhancing media's service 
functions" or "getting closer to the audience". Such framing draws from 
references of values and logics in the past experience of propaganda work and 
interpret ongoing activities in the transitional context in such a way that they 
become ideologically fit for both market and propaganda requirements. 
The coexistence of party and market logics in the symbolic environment 
provides a buffer area where actors could skillfully reference and articulate 
diverse meaning systems in legitimizing appropriate social practices and 
formalizing these practices through recurrent experimentations. The 
articulation of interpretative discourses to legitimate activities would have been 
more difficult had it not been for the existence of an ambiguous ideological and 
symbolic environment. Institutional disagreements and conflicts enable actors 
to discretely select and elaborate diverse institutional logics and meaning 
systems in the form of interpretative discourses which increase the probability 
for certain boundary spanning activities to be formalized through recursive 
practices. 
However, we should not overemphasize the effectiveness of ideological 
framing. We need to note that social actors' capacity to frame an issue in the 
transitional process is still highly dictated by the Party. The angle and 
vocabulary used in discussing an issue still have to come from the Party-state's 
dominant ideology which sees a media organization a propaganda tool. 
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5.5 Discussion 
By studying the process of dialogue and interdependency between ongoing 
activities and subjective interpretation in an ambiguous ideological context, we 
can understand better the micro process of strategic adaptation and how it 
contributes to the macro level adaptation to a changing environment. 
I have identified and illustrated three behavioral patterns of symbolic 
adaptation. These strategic behavioral patterns build a symbolic bridge 
between the old and new institutional logics through searching for 
commonness in different values and governing rules. Understanding how 
individual actors skillfully articulate one set of rules to the other in forming 
interpretative discourses is very important to our understanding of the whole 
transition process, since we believe that these behavioral patterns play a critical 
role in shaping the path of how the symbolic system develops. We also see 
from the cases how an ambiguous ideological context facilitates the strategic 
approach in adapting the old institutional framework to the new context. 
However, as we recognize social actors' skills in symbolic adaptation, we need 
to note that such skills are highly limited to the economic aspect of the social 
life and the angles and language which social actors use to frame an issue have 
to come from the dominant party organ ideology. In the transition stage, the 
market rules have to be interpreted in the language and within framework of 
the propaganda rules when they are legitimized. My field observation suggests 
that the more market values are incorporated into and interpreted through the 





6.1 Reciprocal Behaviors in a Transitional Context 
The third aspect of strategic adaptation is the reciprocal behaviors in a 
transitional context. Reciprocal behaviors in this study refer to individual 
strategic behaviors of networking or personalized approaches based on 
informal favor exchanges in order to maximize organization resources and 
reduce uncertainties in the transition institutional environment. 
In a broader sense, all scholars emphasize the regulative aspects of institutions 
as systems which constrain and regularize behaviors. According to W. Scott 
(1996)，the regulative process may operate through diffuse and informal 
mechanism, or they may be highly formalized and assigned to specific actors. 
D. North (1990) describes institutions as "rules of a game" which are "guides 
to human interactions", and he categorizes these rules as "formal constraints" 
and "informal constraints". North also explains that in transitional societies, 
conflicts often exist between formal constraints and informal constraints, 
because formal constraints can be changed overnight through coercive forces 
or revolutionary events but informal constraints which are formed through 
daily social practices are difficult to change overnight. Therefore, conflicts and 
tensions in institutional changes arise from the conflicts between the changed 
formal constraints and the unchanged informal constraints. 
In China, the many facets of modernization are not equal. While changes of 
formal constraints can be the result of a sudden reform or authoritarian order, 
informal constraints, the deep-rooted norms, cultures and traditions in socialist 
organizations won't change overnight. For Chinese organizations in the reform 
era, the formal constraints in the institutional environment are changing fast 
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from a central planning system and bureaucratic control to more market based 
measures. However, there is still not an adequate legal framework or a 
functioning and well-developed market system, and the transition process is 
very uncertain and full of confusions and conflicts. 
On the other hand, informal constraints characterized by networking based and 
personalized exchanges continue to function as important rules in 
organizational behaviors. In fact, as the formal rules become uncertain and 
inadequate in the transition age, the informal rules play even more important 
roles in social relationships and economic exchanges. 
In this study, I am particularly interested to find out how reciprocal behaviors, 
one of the most important informal rules, are engaged in helping social actors 
deal with institutional demands in a transition context with inadequate formal 
rules. The reciprocal behaviors that I discuss here can be described as 
"networking" or "guanxi" building in the Chinese context where two parties 
establish reciprocal relationship to help one another based on informal 
exchange of favors. 
Conventional wisdom among the Chinese holds that in China, "guanxi" is 
absolutely essential to successfully complete any tasks in virtually all spheres 
of social life. "Guanxi" literally means "relations" or "relationship" and is 
commonly used in Chinese societies to describe individual behaviors of 
networking. In a very general sense, guanxi resembles Pierre Bourdieu (1996),s 
concept of "social capital" which can be converted into other capitals. 
Therefore, guanxi can also be seen as social capital accumulated with the 
intention of converting it into economic or political capital. Institutionalists 
argue that it is the institutional structure or configuration which facilitates or 
encourages the reliance on networks to accomplish tasks. In short economy 
societies which have weak legal infrastructures and ambiguous ruling systems, 
networking or guanxi becomes a fundamental part of economic transactions in 
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coping with the absence of a formal and reliable system of laws and regulations. 
In business terms, networking means knowing the "right" people and making 
connections to accomplish individual and organizational goals (Granovetter 
1973). In some recent academic literatures, networking is defined as an 
individual's attempt to mobilize personal contact in order to profit from 
entrepreneurial opportunities or a firm's effort to cooperate with others in order 
to obtain and sustain competitive advantages (Powell 1990，Burt 1992). 
The networking behaviors I observed during my field study roughly fall into 
two categories, emergent networking and prospective networking. "Emergent 
networking" refers to networking behaviors which are emergent in nature and 
not conductive to long-range planning due to the uncertain institutional 
environment. "Prospective networking", on the other hand, refers to 
networking behaviors with a stronger "strategic intent" (Peng 2000) and are 
more planned in nature. Emergent networking is a more flexible and 
opportunistic approach compared with prospective networking. 
In transitional media organizations like ZJTV, actors are able to soften the 
tensions between an inflexible party organ structure and the new market 
demands through establishing the widespread and rather informal network of 
personal connections built around good faith and tact reciprocity. Under such 
circumstances, emergent networking happens when the advertising department 
deals with the uncertain regulatory environment. This is the case when the 
advertising department tires to establish a reciprocal relationship with the local 
regulatory authorities to gain more authoritarian resource in the immature 
advertising market. On the other hand, prospective networking happens when 
the advertising department deals with limited allocated resources in trying to 
satisfy institutional demands. This is the case when the advertising department 
tries to gain market information through establishing favor exchange 
connections with an advertising agency to improve its competitiveness in 
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market competition. Both behavioral patterns illustrate how individual actors 
are inclined to resort to informal rules, such as network based and personal 
connections, rather than formal rules to solve conflicts in a transition context. 
6.2. Emergent Networking 
For advertising practitioners in China, the advertising market is 
underdeveloped, the regulatory system is immature and the ideological 
framework is ambiguous. The highest administrative body for advertising in 
China is the "SAIC" (the State Administration of Industry and Commerce) 
which is authorized by the State Council to supervise and provide guidance to 
mass media, advertisers and advertising agencies. The advertising office in the 
SAIC drafts regulations, inspects and registers units engaged in advertising 
business, issues advertising business licenses, examines and supervises 
deception and other illegal behaviors in advertising activities and solve 
disputes. Yu (1991) believes that advertising regulations in China have two 
major problems. First, the regulations are too simple and sometimes vague and 
unclear, which leaves too much room for personal interpretation. The second 
problem is the weak enforcement. It is officially held that the problem which 
China's developing advertising market is facing now doesn't lie in the 
allegation that there is no law to abide, but in the fact the people have not 
abided by the law (Beijing Review 1985, 8). The cumbersome administrative 
structure for getting approvals and the simplicity in advertising regulations 
have left the SAIC with a lot of room and arbitrary power in governing and 
interpreting advertising activities. 
In Zhejiang Province, according to figures from the SAIC, 31% of 
advertisements on drugs in the year of 2001 are deceptive ads. Advertisements 
on medical outlets in particular have caused a lot of complains and disputes 
between advertisers and consumers. In early 2002, Zhejiang Provincial 
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Administration of Industry and Commerce promulgated a circular called "The 
2002 Work Plan to Fight Against Deceptive and Illegal Advertisements in 
Zhejiang Province". It is a two page circular demanding measures to reinforce 
regulations on ads on drugs, health products and medical services. 
Advertisements on drugs which include "unscientific claims or exaggerated 
effects" will have to be "cleared out" {qing li). All ads on medical services 
have to follow certain "formats", which means that these ads can not make 
claims except to give information such as the name and location of the medical 
agency, the name and title of doctors and a brief description of their special 
treatments. Like most advertising regulations, these supplement circulars and 
"work spirits" are written in the propaganda style. The "work plan" itself is 
abstract, symbolic and unclear, leaving a lot of room for interpretation which is 
usually in the hands of the supervising authority. Under such circumstances, it 
is not difficult to imagine the importance of maintaining a good relationship 
with the SAIC's advertising office which directly supervises and regulates all 
advertising activities in the province. 
Even though there have been attempts for the central government to 
decentralize its power, the continuity of government control has been largely 
preserved. Moreover, decentralization has made many local level officials 
more powerful. As a result, during the transition period, officials at various 
levels of the government have considerable power to approve projects, allocate 
resources, and arrange financing and distribution (Peng 1996). Peng and Luo 
(1998，1999) found that entrepreneurs' connections with officials are more 
important than those with other organizations in China. Even when these 
officials join the business sector, they may still be able to command substantial 
advantage due to their valuable and unique contacts with their former 
colleagues in the government. 
In our case, networking is frequently drawn as social capital and resource to 
cope with environmental ambiguities. In particular, guanxi is used to gain 
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authoritarian resource in advertising practices from the supervising authority, 
the SAIC, in satisfying dual institutional demands in the absence of a 
developed and transparent ruling system. Since the institutional environment is 
uncertain and unpredictable and there lack a clear and transparent linkage 
between governing rules and activities in the transition age, networking 
behaviors in dealing with the governing authorities mostly occur in an 
emergent manner where actors perform ad hoc guanxi building activities and 
attempt to resolve situations. 
In ELC's advertising department, Mr. Ge's main job responsibility is to 
maintain a good guanxi with the provincial SAIC. He is referred to internally 
and unofficially as the "public relations officer". Mr. Ge who used to work in 
the provincial government office has no prior experience in either advertising 
or media. He was invited to join ZJTV's advertising department mostly 
because of his background and "guan xi wang" (social networks) in the 
government which was believed to be able to "add value" to the channel's 
advertising operations. For Mr. Ge, joining the advertising department has 
brought him some good "fortune" too. He not only gets a basic salary from the 
advertising department, but also gets all kinds of bonuses. He told me that his 
income has multiplied three times since he joined ELC. For the advertising 
department, Mr. Ge has indeed helped solve many problems and has certainly 
made a difference in dealing with the SAIC. Mr. Ge's networking efforts are 
used normally under two circumstances: when an advertiser needs some help in 
getting approval for a particular ad and when the advertising department gets a 
"Notice of Modification" {''zheng gai tong zhi shu'') from the SAIC. Mr. Ge's 
job is to make sure that when such situations come up, the advertising 
department can get some help from the government, the SAIC in particular. 
In the year of 2002, almost 50% of ELC's advertising revenue came from ads 
on drugs and medical services, and 80% of the revenue came from ads on 
products like drugs, health products, cosmetics and household appliances, most 
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of which require approvals by the SAIC. In China's reform era, corruption is a 
well-known and serious problem in supervising authorities. Ms. He in the 
advertising department told me that there are "unofficially" different "prices" 
for getting approvals for different ads. The "price" for getting approval for a 
medical ad would range from RMB 1,000 to RMB3,000, normally "paid" 
through invitations of business dinners. Due to the central government's recent 
policies to strike corruption, bribery has become more secretive and disguised 
in many favor forms, 
In ELC, Mr. Ge keeps regular contact with people in the SAIC's advertising 
office and he knows the office head quite well because they used to work for 
the same government department. When I queried about the simplicity and the 
ambiguities in advertising regulations, Mr. Ge gave me the following 
explanation: "You have to understand that we are in the junior stage {'chu jijie 
duan，) of a socialist society. Of course there are some problems. But in a way, 
it's good for us. If everything is crystal clear, what can be done, what can not 
be done, we will be left with less choices. You should know that a lot of 
problems are now solved in grey areas." Mr. Ge's friend in the SAIC's 
advertising office further explained to me that: "We can not fix everything at 
once. Regulations have to be made step by step. We must first try, let 
problems happen, then we know where the issues are and we try to improve 
our rules." That being said, it explains the preference by the governing 
authority to deal with much simplified and abstract regulations which leave 
them plenty of room for interpretation, thus enabling them to convert the 
authoritarian resource into concrete financial gains. 
ELC's advertising department was once approached by a small sized local 
clinic who wanted to place an ad for their medical services. The clinic 
recorded itself an ad promoting their special medical treatment. However, the 
advertisement was not approved by the SAIC, because the ad was not 
"scientific" enough. The clinic's request was turned down without further 
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explanations on exactly how "unscientific" the ad was. The only response that 
the clinic received was a simple statement saying that: "According to 
advertising regulations, all medical advertisements have to be scientific". 
Disappointed and puzzled, the head of the clinic came to ELC's advertising 
department asking for help, and promised that they would be willing to pay full 
price for the ad if the channel could help them get the approval. Mr. Ge then 
arranged a friendly dinner among the SAIC, the clinic head and himself. There, 
the problem was solved. Ge later told me that the clinic could not get the 
approval because it did not have the right "guanxi". The ad was finally aired 
without any changes being made. 
The advertising department sometimes gets a "Notice of Advertising 
Modification" from the advertising office in the SAIC if the SAIC has found a 
deceptive or illegal ad in ELC's programs. In such cases, Mr. Ge is responsible 
for negotiating with the SAIC on the modification terms and the timeline for 
the modification. In most cases, the advertising department would simply fax 
the Notice to the advertiser or the advertising agency which produced the ad. 
And in most cases, neither the SAIC nor the advertising department would be 
very keen on following up. Both the SAIC and the advertising department 
understand that maintaining a friendly and reciprocal relationship is as 
important as the SAIC's supervisory role. 
Emergent networking helps the media organization deal with the abstract and 
ambiguous regulatory system by allowing actors to perform temporary and ad 
hoc guanxi based favor exchanges with the supervisory authority. Since the 
ruling system lacks transparent, clear and stable "game rules", people in the 
transitional organization have to use shortsighted strategies of networking 
based favor exchanges on a case by case basis to deal with emergent problems. 
Through these emergent favor exchanges, the media organization is able to 
gain more authoritarian resource in an environment where formal rules such as 
the legal infrastructure are underdeveloped. 
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6.3 Prospective Networking 
China's reform, including media reform, happened in a top-down pattern. Not 
only are the path and pace of the marketization process strictly controlled by 
the central government, but the forms and contents of market competition are 
also highly government regulated. This characteristic is reflected in ZJTV's 
transition process. The six specialized channels in ZJTV were designed to 
compete against one another because the provincial government leaders 
thought that "competition brings improvement, be it internal or external". 
Despite the fact that the specialized channels were established to market at 
different audiences, they ended up fighting for audiences with TV dramas, 
which resulted in a zero sum situation. The director of ELC explained this 
situation by arguing that China does not have a mature TV audience market 
and that most viewers use TV programs for entertainment purposes. "China's 
audience market is still developing and niche marketing will be more effective 
in five years' time." He predicted. 
One major problem that people in the advertising department realize is that 
ELC's programming policy lack support by scientific data and that 
programming is based more on subjective imagination than on scientific 
analysis, largely due to the lack of market mechanism and channel's 
incompetence in marketing experience. For example, ELC has a high-rating 
stock market program called "The Bull and Bear Market Battle". Despite its 
popularity among program viewers, this program is scheduled between 18:00 
to 19:00 instead of in prime time, because the channel leaders think that 
"audience of this program are mostly laid off workers, housewives and retired 
people who do not have much purchase power." As a result, a leader's 
personal opinion or impression is more "convincing" or important in program 
scheduling than any real market survey. 
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However, it might be easy for everyone in the advertising department to realize 
that this problem does not help them sell air time to advertisers, there is a long 
way to go before the problem can be solved. Firstly, with limited operational 
funds allocated every year, the advertising department does not have enough 
financial resources to buy a complete and detailed TV rating report from big 
survey companies like AC Nielsen on a timely basis. Secondly, even with the 
rating data, it does not have the overall market knowledge to package the 
information into an attractive sales kit. 
Ms. Wang, head of the advertising department, often complained that the 
station leaders encourage competition among the channels but do not equip the 
channels with the necessary resources or capabilities to compete. Apparently, 
market mechanism is still foreign to those who used to be party organ leaders 
and whose jobs were to fulfill propaganda tasks. Even now they have realized 
the importance of market mechanism, it still takes a long learning curve to 
understand what market mechanism really is. 
Officially incapable to compete in a true market manner, the advertising 
department eagerly and quickly turned outside and found it a collaboration 
partner, a local advertising agency. Hangzhou Si Mei Advertising Agency 
(HZSM) is one of the biggest advertising agencies in Zhejiang province, and 
more importantly, it is a successful private company with flexible and more 
market oriented management style. HZSM has personnel who specialize in 
market surveys and analysis which is exactly what ELC misses. 
However, even though ELC realizes establishing a partnership would be 
helpful to both parties, such alliance has to be handled very carefully on the 
official level. The relationship is believed to be better handled in an informal 
manner and on personal levels, because business alliance with a private client 
company may look suspicious or politically sensitive on the party organ image. 
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As a matter of fact, the relationship is maintained more on a personal and 
informal level between the head of ELC's advertising department and HZSM's 
general manager. 
ELC's strategic partnership with HZSM is much better planned than its 
relationship with the SAIC, since the favor exchanges between ELC and 
HZSM, although still informal, happen in a more regular and stable pattern. 
Instead of trying to solve unexpected and emergent situations in dealing with 
the supervisory authority, ELC's "cooperation" with HZSM has a stronger 
"strategic intent". Therefore, I refer to such behavioral pattern as "prospective 
networking" since actors in the advertising department are more proactive 
under such circumstances than when they are engaged in emergent networking. 
I was once invited to a market analysis presentation which was done by HZSM 
for ELC to help the channel identify its weaknesses and strengths in the 
competitive advertising market. The presentation was informative, analytical 
and detailed with comparative market analysis with other channels. It quoted 
sufficient data which HZSM has obtained from major survey companies 
including AC Nielsen. The market analysis compared ELC's programming 
policy, audience characteristics and advertising revenues with the other five 
specialized channels. The presentation also included a comparison study with 
the CCTVs and other city level stations which share about 70% of the total 
audience market even though these TV stations are regarded as not playing on 
the sane "stage" and therefore not seen as competitors. The market review was 
followed by some suggestions on programming policy. 
During the presentation, Ms. Wang, head of the advertising department secretly 
yet proudly said to me "You should listen carefully. I am sure you can learn 
something from the presentation. They are very professional. Normally, they 
won't do such a detailed market analysis for a TV station, but since I am a 
good friend with the general manager, he did this as a special favor. You know, 
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they are doing the presentation free of charge." Impressed by the 
"professional" market review, Ms. Wong eagerly asked the general manager of 
HZSM to make a sales kit for them to use for client meetings, also for free. 
The presentation was followed by a friendly banquet with people from both 
sides, and I, as an intern student, was "honored" to participate in the banquet. 
During the banquet, atmosphere obviously got more relaxed and both parties 
appeared to become more open-hearted. Ms. Wang first thanked the general 
manager of HZSM for such an informative presentation, and then eagerly 
asked for more help of such kind in the future. "You know" she said sincerely, 
“our staff in the advertising department are very young and inexperienced. We 
really have to rely on you to help us with such market knowledge." The 
general manager happily agreed that they will do all they can to provide the 
advertising department with any marketing data that they would need, and 
prepare marketing materials for the advertising department to use. The banquet 
ended with a friendly chats. Not surprisingly, HZSM later on signed a contract 
with the advertising department that they will get a further 20% discount on 
advertising price compared with the previous year. By the time I left ELC, 
every staff in the advertising department has got a nicely printed and very 
presentable sales kit with up to date viewing rates and market share analysis 
which they would not be capable of doing by themselves. 
This example of getting market information and market knowledge through the 
active approach of favor exchanges is not uncommon in the transitional media 
organization which is faced with new financial pressure but lack market 
experience. Under such circumstances, forming a formal coalition with the 
advertising agency would have to depend on well-developed and transparent 
rules and regulations. Therefore, actors naturally resort to personalized favor 
exchanges to establish the unofficial and informal strategic partnership in order 
to obtain the necessary market information and knowledge. Even though the 
relationship is informal and happens mostly as personalized approaches, such 
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relationship established through prospective networking can be well planned 
and has a stable pattern. 
6.4 Discussion 
I observe during my field study that in the transition process, actors often resort 
to their traditional norms, values and behaviors in solving the new conflicts. 
These traditional norms, values and behaviors are also referred to by 
institutionalists as "informal constraints". In an environment where formal 
institutional constraints such as laws and regulations are weak, the informal 
institutional constraints such as those embodied in the interpersonal networks, 
connections and ties play a more significant role in facilitating economic 
exchanges (North 1990, Peng 1994). The lack of market-supporting institutions 
leaves organizational actors with room to perform individual attempts in 
making personal contacts in order to obtain market information, interpreting 
rules and enforcing economic contracts. 
In the transition process where formal constraints and informal constraints do 
not evolve at the same pace and where formal constraints characterized as 
formal laws and regulations are weak and unclear, informal constraints 
characterized as networking based and personalized exchanges continue to 
function as important rules in organizational behaviors. In fact, informal 
constraints tend to function as more important governing rules for 
organizational actions than formal constraints in the transition process. My 
field study shows that individual actors almost always resort to informal 
constraints, such as reciprocal behaviors like networking, to solve problems 
caused by institutional ambiguities and to soften environmental tensions. 
Because the formal constraints, such as advertising laws and regulations and 
the linkage between the governing rules and activities are non-transparent and 
largely arbitrary, knowledgeable actors naturally turn to the informal 
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constraints in their strategic approaches. This is why we observe that reciprocal 
behaviors or networking based favor exchanges become an even more effective 
and important strategy for a transitional organization. 
I have illustrated above two behavioral patterns of networking used by actors in 
the advertising department, i.e. emergent networking and prospective 
networking. Emergent networking happens in the advertising department's 
relationship with the supervising authority in dealing with emergent and 
unexpected problems arising from a transitional and therefore unstable 
environment. Situated in a transitional context with weak legal infrastructure 
and an ambiguous ruling system, the media organization maintains a reciprocal 
relationship with the supervisory authority in order to maximize limited 
authoritarian resource and reduce uncertainties in the unclear institutional 
environment. 
Collaboration with an advertising agency enables the advertising department to 
obtain crucial market information with limited financial resources. This 
relationship is maintained more proactively through favor exchanges based on 
prospective networking. In prospective networking, actors develop informal 
and personalized relationships with a strategic partner in a more stable and well 
planned pattern than emergent networking, since unlike the supervisory body, a 
collaboration partner such as the advertising agency is much more predictable 
and willing to cooperate. 
As institutionalists argue that the reliance on informal rules to accomplish tasks 
is facilitated or encouraged by the institutional structure in the transition age 
which lack an adequate legal infrastructure and a transparent ruling system, we 
can reasonably argue that as a society evolves and the institutional environment 
becomes more stable, we would expect to see a decline in the reliance on such 
informal rules. In other words, just as we expect to see networking or guanxi 
becomes a fundamental part of economic transactions and social exchanges in 
82 
coping with the absence of a formal and reliable system of laws and regulations 
in a transition society, we should expect to see less networking or guanxi 
building behaviors in economic transactions and social exchanges as a formal 
and reliable ruling system is developed in a more stabilized society. However, 
since informal and formal constrains are equally important in shaping an 
institutional context, we should not ignore the importance of strategic 




7.1 Summary of Findings 
This qualitative study is based on my field research in the advertising 
department of Economic Life Channel in Zhejiang TV Station from June to 
July 2002. In this study, I have tried to look at how a transitional media 
organization in China adapts itself to the changing environment from the neo-
economic-sociology perspective, with a focus on examining the mechanism of 
how the new market logic is incorporated into a party organ structure. To 
answer this question, I draw from previous studies on transition societies in the 
fields of both institutionalism and sociology and put forward the concept of 
"strategic adaptation" to describe the interaction of social actors, organizational 
structure and institutional constraints. I try to use the concept of "strategic 
adaptation" to explain how macro-level tensions are dealt with by micro-level 
strategies, and therefore hope to create a micro-macro linkage in China's media 
studies. 
To illustrate strategic adaptation, I reviewed previous literatures and studies on 
transitional societies and organizations and generalized several behavioral 
patterns which I expected as I analyze my research data from the field study. I 
categorized these behavioral patterns as the three aspects of strategic adaptation, 
i.e. structural adaptation, symbolic adaptation and reciprocal behaviors. My 
analysis is focused on how individual actors adopt strategic approaches in 
dealing with different institutional demands in a transition process and how 
such strategies help a media organization adapt to the transitional environment. 
"Structural adaptation" refers to individual strategic behaviors in broadening 
and spanning an organization's structural boundaries in the transitional context. 
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In this study, structural adaptation mainly refers to the approach to strategically 
decouple the different values which govern the organizational structure and 
daily activities so that actors are able to create a sub-context in the party organ 
institution. Such sub-context is created through reorganizing physical space, 
modifying routine practices or reinterpreting job tasks. It facilitates market 
oriented behaviors by providing a setting where the new market values can be 
easily interpreted as the governing institutional logic. I identified and 
illustrated three behavioral patterns of structural adaptation from my field study 
which I summarize as spanning of space, spanning of practice and spanning of 
identity. Spanning of space refers to the strategic behaviors to organize 
physical space in creating a setting which facilitates one set of institutional 
logic (the market logic in our case) rather than the other (the propaganda logic 
in our case) to be the governing rule of daily activities. Spanning of practice 
refers to the strategic behaviors to actively reconstruct and reproduce the 
meaning and contents of routine activities structured under the old institutional 
logic and adapt them to the new institutional demands. Spanning of identity 
refers to the strategic behaviors to increase the mobility of identity in the 
organization through linking and reconstructing identities established under 
different value systems to fit into the relatively unstable social and 
organizational context in a transition age. We need to note that structural 
adaptation always happens in a temporary, informal and opportunistic manner 
and is highly limited to daily activities directly related to advertising practices. 
"Symbolic adaptation" refers to individual strategic behaviors to articulate and 
bridge old and new value systems in the transition symbolic environment by 
drawing on norms and values from the old symbolic framework and adapting 
them to the new context through interpretative discourses. I identified and 
illustrated three behavioral patterns of symbolic adaptation which I summarize 
as boundary blurring, symbolic packaging and ideological framing. Boundary 
blurring refers to the strategic behaviors to blur the formal and informal 
boundaries which define institutional demands by carefully interpreting the 
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symbolic meaning of these institutional demands. Symbolic packaging refers 
to the strategic behaviors to justify and legitimize certain boundary activities or 
practices by attaching the dominant symbolic rules to these activities or 
practices so that they become ideologically fit in the dominant symbolic 
framework. Ideological framing refers to the strategic behaviors to select, link 
and articulate different ideological statements in forming an interpretative 
scheme to frame and justify "out of frame" activities or practices. We need to 
note that symbolic adaptation is highly limited to the economic aspect of social 
life and the angles and language which social actors use to frame an issue have 
to come from the dominant party organ ideology. 
Reciprocal behaviors refer to individual strategic behaviors of networking or 
personalized approaches based on informal favor exchanges in order to 
maximize resources and reduce uncertainties in the transition institutional 
environment. I identified and illustrated two behavioral patterns of reciprocal 
behaviors which I summarize as emergent networking and prospective 
networking. Emergent networking refers to networking behaviors which are 
emergent in nature and not conductive to long-range planning due to the 
uncertain institutional environment. Prospective networking, on the other hand, 
refers to networking behaviors with a stronger strategic intent and which are 
more planned in nature. We would expect to see a decline in the reliance on 
such informal rules to accomplish tasks in a more stabilized society which has 
an adequate legal infrastructure and a transparent ruling system. 
My data analysis further suggests that the processes through which these 
strategies are adopted and implemented are largely facilitated by the existence 
of an ambiguous and inconsistent institutional environment. The disagreement 
between old and new institutional logics does not necessarily limit social 
actors' strategic choices, but on the contrary, it facilitates individual strategies 
of proactively selecting and articulating the more effective set of institutional 
logic as the governing value and skillfully bridging different institutional logics 
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to justify daily activities. In a transitional context, the existence of 
environmental ambiguities can provide a "buffer area" which helps transitional 
organizations and individual actors to legitimize some boundary spanning 
activities and adapt to the changing environment. This also explains why the 
existence of institutional disagreements and ambiguities has its positive social 
impact in a transition society like China. 
7.2 "Strategic Adaptation" 
China's media reform context, like many other transitional social contexts, is 
characterized as an ambiguous institutional environment with different 
institutional logics and demands. The old institutional logic and demands are 
the traditional socialist party organ logic and the propaganda demands. While 
the new institutional logic and demands are the market oriented logic and the 
financial pressures. Since the organizational structure of the party organ 
remains largely intact, conflicts in the institutional demands have to be dealt 
with very much on the micro level. 
"Strategic adaptation" refers to the social and economic process through which 
strategies are selected and implemented on the micro level with the purpose to 
solve tensions and conflicts arising from environmental changes and thus 
facilitate an organization's adaptation to macro-level transitions. 
There are both individual and organizational level processes of strategic 
adaptation. On the individual level, the process through which individual actors 
choose and implement strategies are highly institutionally situated and context 
specific, which means that the strategic approaches social actors adopt have to 
be adapted to the specific settings in which actors are situated. On the 
organizational level, we should not assume a mechanic and automatic response 
to institutional demands, but rather, we need to note the complex situation of a 
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transition process where organizational structures are shaped by the interplay 
of political and economic forces. In our case, the media organizational 
structure is shaped by both financial and non-financial interests of the central 
government, and thereby creating a complex situation. Therefore, the process 
of an organization's adaptation to the institutional environment must be viewed 
from both economic and sociology perspective. 
7.3 A Micro and Macro Link 
China's media reform has its uniqueness and commonness in transition society 
studies. The uniqueness is reflected by its disjunctive nature and the 
characteristics of a marketization under socialist ideological control. The 
commonness of the transition process is reflected by an ambiguous institutional 
environment incorporating both old and new institutional logics and value 
systems. I refer to China's media reform as a process of partial 
commercialization since it is characterized by the coexistence of continued 
party control and new market demands. Traditional institutional studies on 
transition societies hold that since organizations are shaped by their 
institutional environments, an organization in transition would have a hybrid 
nature and develop a corresponding and responsive structure to cope with 
conflicting goals. Therefore, traditional institutional studies have more or less 
focused on how organizational structures evolve to respond to different 
institutional pressures. However, the explanation of interplay between 
organization and institution alone is not sufficient in understanding what is 
happening in China's media reform. The uniqueness of a reform under both 
market force and socialist ideological control requires that we look at other 
factors which contribute to the organization-institution interplay. 
Instead of viewing the organizational structure as a mechanical response to the 
institutional environment, we need to note the active role which individual 
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actors play in strategically dealing with environmental uncertainties and 
increasing an organization's adaptability in a transitional context. Therefore, I 
adopted the neo-economic-sociology approach which combines the economic 
view and the sociology view to study the transition process. Instead of isolating 
an economic action from a social action, I view individual actors as both agents 
involved in economic transaction arrangements and actors who are socially 
constructed and situated. By taking the neo-economic-sociology approach, I 
view business strategies also as intended social behaviors. 
Instead of focusing on the organization and institution interplay alone, I study 
the individual-organization-institution interactive relationship which links the 
micro and macro transition processes. This micro-macro linkage is important 
in studying China's media reform, because China's media organizations do not 
reveal significant structural transformations which might fit into the patterns 
described in traditional institutional studies. The characteristics of China's 
media reform have held back any significant changes in either the ownership 
structure or the decision making process within the media organizations, which 
leads to the continuity of a government organ structure despite the increasing 
financial pressure. If we simply look at the organization-institution interaction, 
we might find it difficult to understand how a propaganda tool could survive 
the market competition while neglecting many micro-level strategic approaches 
in the process. Through the linkage of micro and macro level analysis, we are 
able to have a clearer picture of the incompatibility between organizational 
structure and institutional demands on the one hand, and the survival of the 
media organization under market pressure on the other hand. The uniqueness 
of China's media reform as a process of commercialization under socialist 
ideological control reminds us of the importance of individual level strategies 
in a transition process. 
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7.4 Generalizability and Boundaries of Findings 
To understand the generalizability and boundaries of my findings in this study, 
we need to note that there are two different levels of findings. 
Firstly, the concept of "strategic adaptation' has its theoretical and practical 
significance in both institutional and sociology studies. In the sense that the 
concept of "strategic adaptation" emphasizes the linkage between micro-level 
strategic approaches and macro-level environmental changes, the concept has a 
universal application in the studies of transitional contexts where social actors 
and organizations try to adapt to a changing environment. As we believe that 
the interactive relationship of social actors, organizational structure and 
institutional environment is constantly evolving, the issue of adaptation always 
exists, and individual-level strategies and organizational responses should not 
be viewed separately in a transition process. In a sense, we can even argue that 
a social context is always in transition and is never static, and therefore 
adaptive behaviors will always exist in the interaction among individuals, 
organizations and institutions. Hence the concept of "strategic adaptation" has 
a theoretical significance in any social contexts. 
However, although strategic adaptation will always exist, the extents and 
degrees of strategic adaptation vary from context to context. Since we have 
also found in this study that micro-legal strategies are largely facilitated by the 
existence of an ambiguous and inconsistent institutional environment, the 
different extents to which social contexts are ambiguous in their governing 
rules would lead us to conclude the difference in behaviors of strategic 
adaptation between transition and more stabilized societies. In other words, we 
should expect to see less efforts of strategic adaptation in a more stabilized 
context than in a transitional context, and micro-level strategic approaches 
would be less effective in achieving social and economic goals in a more 
stabilized society since the interaction of individuals, organizations and 
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institutions is more stabilized and regularized in such a context. In a more 
stable society or context which has an adequate and more formalized ruling 
system, the reliance on micro-level strategies to accomplish tasks would 
decline. 
The second level of my findings is the specific behavioral patterns which I 
summarized and illustrated in the study. These behavioral patterns of strategic 
adaptation are developed from existing studies on transitional societies and 
organizations, and therefore we should expect to see the patters of structural 
adaptation, symbolic adaptation and reciprocal behaviors in other transitional 
organizations, although some behavioral patterns may be more obvious than 
others in different contexts. Even though I illustrated the patterns with the 
cases from my field study in a provincial TV station in China, the behavioral 
patterns are certainly not limited to a provincial TV station or even other media 
organizations in China. These patterns of strategic adaptation can also be 
generalized to studies on other transitional organizations, but again, we should 
note the differences in how each pattern is reflected and how effective a 
particular strategic behavior can be in different contexts. For example, patterns 
of symbolic adaptation would be less obvious and effective in a pure economic 
organization than in a media organization because of the different levels of 
ideological control. Even among different media organizations such as a city 
level and a national level media organization, the extent to which symbolic 
adaptation is used to accommodate market oriented practices would be 
different due to the difference in authoritarian control over different levels of 
party organs. And on the other hand, patters of structural adaptation might be 
more apparent and powerful in an economic organization than in a media 
organization since authoritarian control over structural transformations is more 
relaxed for economic organizations. We might also expect to find that the 
reliance on reciprocal behaviors to achieve goals has significant importance for 
all types of organizations in a transitional context due to the non-transparency 
and uncertainties of the formal rule system in the overall environment. 
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However, we should not overemphasize the effectiveness of micro-level 
strategies in dealing with environmental conflicts. We need to note that such 
micro-level approaches mostly happen in ad hoc and informal maimers and 
they are usually shortsighted and highly context oriented. Therefore, they can 
not substitute a set of well-established and transparent formal governing rules 
and can only be seen as temporary rather than ultimate solutions to problems 
caused by the tensions and conflicts between organizational structure and 
institutional demands. 
I also wish to point out that constraint and freedom are two sides of the coin 
and should not be viewed separately. For example, in our case, we need to note 
that the party propaganda demand is still the dominate force for media 
organizations whose eagerness to copy the western commercial model is very 
much at the mercy of the Party-state's will. Subsequently, micro-level 
strategies are largely constrained by the constantly changing institutional 
context. 
7.5 Limitations and Agenda for Future Research 
The research data for this study is collected in a single field trip in a provincial 
TV station in China. Through this case study, I hope to contribute to a better 
understanding of the process of organizational adaptation to institutional 
environment in a transition society like China. To do so, I reviewed previous 
studies on transitional societies, and identified, categorized and illustrated 
several micro-level behavioral patterns of strategic adaptation in the 
transitional context. 
However, there are limitations to this qualitative study due to the availability of 
research data during my field trip and the limitations on research methods. For 
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example, as an intern student in ZJTV, I had limited access to management 
level data, especially on the higher level decision-making processes in the 
organization. In addition to the cases used in this study which describe the 
effectiveness of micro-level strategies, I have also selected cases where such 
strategic behaviors are not very effective in dealing with institutional conflicts, 
in order to make sure that we are not looking at a one-sided picture. Then 
again, the selection of such "counter" cases is also limited by the availability of 
my research data. 
The data collected during my field trip mainly comes from one unit in the 
media organization, the advertising department, and therefore the strategic 
adaptation I discussed is developed from my field experience in the advertising 
department. My discussion could be enhanced by analyzing more data from 
the other units in the organization so that we can understand how different units 
interact in the strategic adaptation process in the transitional context. For 
example, I did not have a great deal of research data from the editorial unit or 
the central management office in ZJTV, except for some in-depth interviews. I 
believe that my discussions on the micro-level strategic approaches would be 
more interesting and in-depth if I could further discuss how the different units 
of ZJTV interact with each other in strategic adaptation and if there are 
different micro levels of such approaches in the organization. 
Although I have tried to gather data from all possible sources, the limited 
timeline of my field study also sets limitation to my findings. Therefore, a valid 
counter-argument of this study would be to question the effectiveness of the 
micro-level strategies considering the passing of time and continuous changes 
in the context. As I argued earlier that when the institutional environment 
evolves towards a more developed and transparent ruling system, including the 
legal and legislative system, we would expect to observe less of such micro-
level strategies. It will be interesting to find out some evolving patterns of 
these strategies as a society becomes more stabilized and also to examine 
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exactly how significant these micro-level strategies become in a more 
stabilized society. I believe an interesting agenda for future studies on this topic 
would be to discuss how the interplay of micro-level strategies and macro-level 
environment evolves over a much longer period of time. 
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